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Abstract 
Over the past few decades, relocation of global flower production from traditional hubs in 
Western Europe and North America towards developing countries has become recurrent in the 
global flower industry. In line with this trend, Ethiopia has emerged as one of the hot 
destination for flower production. Although flower production as a commercial undertaking is 
relatively new to its economy, the country came to be one of the main global suppliers. In 
about a decade time, the country has becomes the second largest exporter in Africa and the 
fifth largest non-EU exporter to the EU flower market. In view of this development, this study 
examines FDI flow and competitiveness in the country’s flower industry by using Porter’s 
(1990) diamond as analytical framework. The study employs a mixture of primary and 
secondary data sources including interview and survey conducted with flower farm 
managers/owners, and governmental and industry experts; and analysis of policy document, 
trade and other economic data from government organisations; United Nation Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Ethiopian Horticultural Producers and Exporters 
Association. The analysis uncovered the instrumental role FDI played for the emergence of 
the Ethiopian flower industry into the global scene. Although the export value has been 
growing over the years, over the past few years the sector’s performance has been patchy as it 
not only lagged behind expectation but also showed a mixed trend. In addition, interesting 
inconsistency regarding the export value reported by the Ethiopian authorities and the value 
reported by the importing countries has been uncovered. With respect to the sector’s 
competitiveness, the analysis revealed that the friendly investment climate in combination 
with the favourable factor conditions is the major catalysts in making the sector globally 
competitive. The other determinants of competitiveness i.e. related and supporting industries, 
demand condition and firm structure and rivalry are found to be weak.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background of the study 
The contribution of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the development of a country has 
been a recurring theme in the economics literature over the past few decades. The theory 
identifies a range of channels through which FDI contributes to host countries’ economy 
although empirical evidence does not provide conclusive evidence (Görg & Greenaway, 
2004; Krkoska, 2001; Agosin & Mayer, 2000). In its classic role, FDI is considered as 
promoting capital formation in the host country by filling the gap between desired 
investments and domestically mobilized saving and thereby contribute to GDP (Krkoska, 
2001; Ndikumana & Verick, 2008; Krkoska, 2001; Agosin & Mayer, 2000). In addition to 
this, FDI is also regarded as generating productivity spillovers to a host country’s economy by 
facilitating the transfer of valuable technology, know-how, improvement of labour 
productivity, managerial practice and competitiveness (Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 
1998; Findlay, 1978; Wang & Blomstrom, 1992). 
With the ambition to augment the indirect benefits of FDI with the primary benefits of 
boosting their GDP, governments across the world have been making conscious efforts 
ranging from creating conducive investment environments to granting incentives to attract 
FDI. Over the past few decades, the emerging and developing world has witnessed a 
pragmatic policy shift in this regard. Many of these countries have shifted their focus to 
outward-looking export oriented strategy in place of the inward-looking import substitution 
strategy, which they experimented for many years before (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & 
Sapsford, 1996; Kokko, 2002). The Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, China, and 
Singapore are prime examples in this regard (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & Sapsford, 1996; 
Sun, 1998). In line with this trend, many African countries are now actively seeking FDI by 
undertaking economic and political reforms designed to improve their investment 
environment (Dupasquier & Osakwe, 2006).  
In the case of African countries, FDI is of paramount significance. Generally in less 
developed countries (LDCs) the level of national saving is extremely low and hence, there 
exists a huge gap between the required rate of investment and the existing rate of savings 
(Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, & Servén, 2000). To their dismay, most of these countries do not 
have access to international capital markets. This makes both official assistances from 
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developed countries and FDI of great importance to African countries. However, post-
financial crisis austerity measures have resulted in the reduction of the official development 
assistance over the past few years (OECD, 2014). This makes FDI the most important 
alternative source of foreign capital for African countries as it provides access to foreign 
capital that would otherwise be unavailable. Acknowledging this, African countries are 
exerting a wide range of inducements to attract FDI such as reducing taxes, establishing an 
investment promotion agency to assist foreign investors and abolishing FDI-related 
restrictions. Increasing effort has also been put in initiating policies aimed at enhancing 
bilateral, regional and multilateral levels international cooperation and/or integration in 
matters relating to FDI (Asiedu, 2006).   
As is a case in many other African countries, the Ethiopian government has been taking 
similar moves. Since 1991, the incumbent government has been undertaking a wide range of 
liberal reforms aimed at realigning the country’s economic institutions to fit to the emerging 
milieu (Philibert, 2001). Various macroeconomic policies and reforms have been undertaken 
to make the investment environment friendly to foreign investors. In line with this, the 
investment regime has been liberalized through a series of proclamations and reform 
processes in such a way that foreign investors are not only allowed to participate but also get a 
wide range of inducements  in several industries (UN, 2002; Weissleder, 2009).  All the 
liberalization measures undertaken in the post 1991 period have encouraged foreign 
investment flows into the country (UN, 2002). One of the sectors in which FDI plays 
significant role is the flower industry. The Ethiopian flower industry represents an exemplary 
sector to examine the flow and consequences of FDI in developing countries.  The sector 
came to existence in the late 1990’s. In spite of its late entry into the flower export industry, in 
about a decade time Ethiopia came to be the 2
nd
 largest in Africa next to Kenya and the 5
th
 
largest non-EU exporter to the EU cut-flower market (Gebreeyesus & Iizuka, 2010). To keep 
up the momentum, the sector needs to be competitive enough to continually attract FDI. In 
view of this development, this study aims at answering the following questions-  
 What are the trends and structure of FDI in the Ethiopian floral industry?  
 How competitive is the sector? 
 What are the opportunities and challenges for the sector ahead? 
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1.2 Objectives of the study 
This paper aims at providing an analysis of the FDI flow and competitiveness in the Ethiopian 
flower industry. In doing so, it tries to achieve the following objectives – 
 To examine the trend and structure of FDI in the Ethiopian flower industry 
 To assess the competitiveness of the Ethiopian flower industry and thereby provide 
contextual insight into the main issues surrounding the sector 
 To assess the effectiveness of the measures taken by the Ethiopian and thereby give 
recommendations for policies directed towards the sector.  
1.3 Scope of the study  
The flower industry is a truly international industry with a value chain stretching across 
countries and continents. The chain involves a wide range of participants ranging from 
suppliers and producers to supermarket distributors, research institutions and capital investors. 
Making an insightful and comprehensive competitiveness study entails the inclusion of the 
whole value chain in the study. It is obvious that a comprehensive study covering each and 
every single element in the value chain calls for an extended deal of time, financial and other 
resources. Given the financial and temporal constraint faced, it is impossible to do so. To this 
end, the analysis of this study is confined to the flower industry actors within Ethiopia in 
general and flower producers in Ethiopia as focal points in particular. However, when needed 
and when data and literature from secondary sources are available, the study tries to take 
account of foreign parties and actors which have direct and indirect implication to the 
competitiveness of the Ethiopian flower industry.  
With respect to the geographical scope of the study, it would have been more comprehensive 
if the study included all producers from all geographical areas within Ethiopia. However, the 
sparse distribution of clustered farms made visiting each establishment for data collection 
cumbersome and impossible. In line with this, decision was made to focus on those flower 
producers located nearby to Addis Ababa and along the main international road from Addis 
Ababa to Hawassa city due to their easy accessibility to collect data within the limited time 
and financial resource. Although this decision leaves out some of the producers, the fact that 
this area is highly concentrated with flower producers makes it possible to find desirable 
number of flower producers.  
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1.4 Significance of the study  
Most of the previous studies that have been conducted on the Ethiopian flower industry focus 
on the sector’s evolution, socio-economic and environmental impact, labour force issues, and 
income distribution. Focusing on the evolution of the sector, Gebreeyesus & Iizuka (2010) 
provides detailed naration on the Ethiopian flower industry’s emergence. In a related theme, 
Gebreeyesus & Sonobe (2011) analyze how capabilities in the Ethiopian flower industry were 
formed and took shape while meeting the complex standards and trading procedures the 
global flower market requires. Focusing on the promotional activity of the government and 
environmental impact, Belwal & Chala (2008) on their part analyze the catalysts and barriers 
to the growth of the flower industry. With respect to labour, Taylor (2011) examines the role 
existing Ethiopian skills have played in the industry and how these skills have developed over 
time with the involvement of universities and international institutions in the implementation 
of training programmes. In a related theme, Nigatu (2010) assesses occupational welfare and 
the provision of income and other benefits for workers within the industry. Tilahun (2012) 
assessed the impact of cut flower in relation to the environment, economic and occupational 
health and safety, while Taylor  (2011) explored how the benefits that accrue to various actors 
within the flower industry network are distributed. Melese and Helsing (2010), in their part, 
studied the implication of foreign capital domination, particularly of Dutch firms, in the 
sector.  
None of the studies focus on the competitiveness of the sector. This study aims at filling this 
gap by assessing the flow of FDI and competitiveness within the Ethiopian flower industry. It 
is therefore expected to contribute to the understanding of the Ethiopian floriculture industry. 
More importantly, the outcomes of the study are expected to provide insightful information 
and valuable implication to policy makers and other stakeholders in formulating appropriate 
policies. In addition, it would also be helpful to the producers association, producers and other 
market actors by providing them thick description of the sector’s competitiveness, challenges 
and prospects. Furthermore, the research could identify different research gaps which may 
initiate researchers to undertake further study related to the sectors’ competitiveness. It can 
also serve as an empirical basis for further studies. 
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1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
This paper is organized into eight chapters. The first chapter sets out to outline the study’s 
research questions, objectives, significance and scope. Chapter two draws on the study’s 
analytical framework. Chapter three deals with the research approach and methodologies 
employed. Chapter four presents the global flower industry. Chapter five describes the 
Ethiopian political and economic context within which the flower industry evolved. Chapter 
six gives an account of the Ethiopian flower industry’s development. Chapter seven assesses 
FDI within the sector. Chapter eight examines the sector’s competitiveness. The last chapter 
provides concluding remark.  
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2 Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Foreign Direct Investment Theories 
In order to thoroughly dig into the driving forces of foreign direct investment (FDI), it is 
important to have a clear understanding of the activities that the phenomenon of FDI 
encompasses. Foreign investment across national borders is generally conceived as the flow 
of private capital by firms or individuals of one country into those of another. Such 
investment can take two forms: foreign portfolio investment and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (Hymer, 1976). Foreign portfolio investment (FPI) refers to passive holdings of 
securities such as foreign stocks, bonds, or other financial assets, none of which entails active 
management of the securities' issuer by the investor. Through such investments foreign 
nationals and institutions take indirect control of firms or existing assets. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI), on the other hand, refers to an investment in which a firm or 
individual in one country invests in a subsidiary residing in another country in exchange for 
ownership stakes (full or partial) and thereby, exercise a significant degree of control on the 
management of the enterprise. The direct ownership stake reflects establishment of a lasting 
interest that implies the existence of a long-term relationship between a resident enterprise 
(the investor) in one economy and an enterprise getting the investment residing in another 
economy. Such investments are conventionally defined as the acquisition of 10% or more of 
the assets of a foreign enterprise (OECD, 2008). 
Even though researchers have tried to develop theories that explain the motivations for 
investment across national boundaries, there is no universally accepted theory. According to 
Hosseini (2005), the early attempt to explain FDI can be traced in the neoclassical trade 
theories. Traditional classical theories presume that there could be no international flows of 
capital and labour if markets work effectively and if there are no barriers in terms of trade or 
competition. Neoclassical theories tried to develop a model of international trade that 
accommodates foreign investment by relaxing the assumption of international factor 
immobility. These theories regarded the difference in return on capital between nations as the 
driving force for foreign investment. Firms are conceived as having the incentive to invest 
their capital in those countries where they get higher return for their invested capital. The 
capital flow is, thus, assumed to continue to the high return country until return on capital is 
equalized across countries. In these theories, capital and trade are treated as substitutes and 
hence, if barriers to trade are liberalised, capital flows are not rationalised (Hosseini, 2005). 
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However, the post WWII experience does not fit with this hypothesis. If lower trade barriers 
lead to reduction of FDI, the post war liberalization policies pursued by many countries across 
the world should have resulted in falling FDI. However, the evidence overwhelmingly 
suggests that neoclassical theories are deficient in explaining the recent patterns of FDI 
(UNCTAD(a), 2014; OECD, 2014; OECD, 2005; Jungnickel, 1993). According to Zebreg 
(1998), the neoclassic model’s inability to pridict the patterns of FDI more reasonably 
emanates from its unrealistic assumptions of perfect competition, risk neutrality and absence 
of barriers to movement and transaction costs.  
According to Hosseini (2005), these theoretical shortcomings were first observed by Hymer 
(1976). Analyzing the behavior of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and their FDI activities 
from the perspective of firms’ strategic behaviour and markets’ structure, Hymer (1976) 
contended that firms’ decision to invest overseas is best explained as a strategy to capitalize 
on certain capabilities not shared by competitors. He assumed that local firms are better 
informed about local economic environment and hence, operate at an advantage in 
comparison to Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) that have additional costs when doing 
business abroad. According to him, MNEs can compete successfully in foreign markets only 
so far as they possess certain advantages that are sufficient enough to outweigh the 
disadvantages they face in competing with indigenous firms. In order to take advantage of 
these benefits, the market for these advantages has to be imperfect so that the MNEs gain 
competitive advantages over their local counterparts. These advantages can take different 
forms such as  larger or cheaper capital, intangible assets (trade names, patents, and superior 
management), superior marketing techniques, better products, superior technology, privileged 
access to raw materials and firm-level economies of scale (Hymer, 1976; Hosseini, 2005). 
No matter how plausible Hymer’s (1976)  hypothesis is, his dissertation is argued to have 
failed in distinguishing between two types of market imperfections- the structural type and the 
transaction-cost type.  Structural imperfections comes from the ownership advantages of 
factors such as proprietary technology, privileged access to inputs, scale economies, control of 
distribution systems, and product differentiation and hence, would lead to deviation from 
perfect competition in the product market whereas the transaction cost type imperfections 
arise naturally and are assumed to be exogenous to the MNE (Hosseini, 2005). According to 
Hosseini (2005), Hymer’s (1976)  market imperfection hypothesis focuses on the structural 
imperfections. Drawing on this shortcoming, Buckley & Casson (1985; 1976) developed 
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internalization theory that adresses the transaction-cost type imperfection. According to this 
theory, firms aspire to develop their own internal markets whenever transactions can be made 
at lower cost within the firm. The process of internalization involves the integration of 
operations and activities formerly carried out by intermediate markets under the ownership 
and governance of the firm (Buckley & Casson, 1985; Buckley & Casson, 1976). 
Hymer’s (1976) market imperfection theory and the internalization paradign that followed it 
offer sound insights to explain the driving forces of FDI. However, individually each of these 
theories is limited in providing a complete picture. To make up for this, Dunning (1981; 1977)  
developed a unified theory of international production that combines the afore-discussed 
paradigms to explain the existence, activities and strategies of MNEs. His eclectic theory of 
international production suggests that the propensity of a firm to initiate foreign production 
will depend on the presence of three conditions: ownership (firm-specific), location and 
internalisation advantages. According to the ownership advantage hypothesis, MNE must 
possess ownership advantages such as superior technology, superior product, or transferable 
economies of scale and scope, brand name, trade mark etc that are not available to the host 
country firms. The ownership advantage relates to Hymer’s (1976)  imperfect markets 
proposition. When the ownership condition is fulfilled, according to the second condition, it 
must be more advantageous for the company that owns them to use the advantages itself 
rather than sell them or rent them to other firms through contractual arrangements such as 
licensing, the establishment of joint ventures, or managerial contracting. This condition 
embodies the transaction-cost-based imperfection upon which the internalization paradigm 
rooted. The third condition, location advantage, states that there should be locational 
advantages that enable MNEs to exploit their ownership advantages more profitably by 
locating some part of their activities in another country. With the addition of location 
advantage, the eclectic paradigm makes it clear that not only the ownership advantage and 
internalization advantages play a role in determining FDI activities but also the competitive 
advantages of potential host-countries (Dunning J. , 1992).  
As the discussion so far highlights, the theories ranging from the orthodox neoclassical school 
of thought to the heterodox eclectic perspectives have tried to answer the question why a firm 
would choose FDI over export or licensing. In doing so, each of the paradigms have tried to 
build on the shortcomings of their predecessor and in the process, have gradually moved the 
theory of FDI away from the narrow confines of traditional economics to a more 
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interdisciplinary approach. The most influential approach that provided a cohesive conceptual 
framework to explain why MNEs choose FDI rather than serve foreign markets through other 
alternative modes is the one orchestrated by Dunning (1981; 1977). He argues that only 
realistic assumptions that base on an eclectic approach can provide a convincing explanation 
to the phenomenon of FDI. In this study, his eclectic approach is used as baseline in 
conceptualizing the flow of FDI in the Ethiopian Flower Industry. In the section to follow, his 
location advantage paradigm is used as a basic point of departure in developing a conceptual 
framework to provide the conceptual framework for the competitiveness of the Ethiopian 
Flower Industry. 
2.2 National Competitiveness 
In his eclectic theory, Dunning (1981; 1977) made it clear that firms would locate their 
production activities in those countries where they can exploit their ownership advantages 
more profitably. This implicitly would mean that they select those countries that have better 
competitiveness relative to other countries. It is therefore pivotal for nations to take measures 
that enhance their competitiveness (Porter, 1990).   
The concept of competitiveness refers to an entity’s ability to compete. According to Li 
(2011), competitiveness can be explained by the current state and future prospect. Each of the 
two can be further described by two dimensions. The current state can be explained by an 
entity’s effectiveness and efficiency in accomplishing the competitive goals whereas the 
future prospect is portrayed by the sustainability of current state (current competitiveness) and 
the potential to improve on current state. The ideas embodied in this orientation goes in line 
with Porter’s (1990) proposition of innovation and upgrading as pivotal to competitiveness. 
The current state, when translated to Porter’s (1990) competitive-advantage notion, would 
mean how effective and efficient a nation’s current productivity is relative to other countries. 
The future prospect refers to how sustainable the current productivity level is and how good 
the potential to improve is.   
The basic idea of competitiveness can be seen from two levels: micro and macro perspective. 
At firm level, it can be described as a firm’s ability to compete, grow and be profitable. 
Competitiveness at this level is determined by a firm’s ability to consistently and profitably 
produce products that meet the requirements of an open market. Any firm must meet these 
requirements if it is to remain in business, and the more competitive a firm is relative to its 
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rivals, the greater will be its ability to gain market share. Conversely, uncompetitive firms will 
find their market share decline, and ultimately are bound to go out of business (Li, 2011). At a 
macro level, the concept is vaguely defined and much more controversial. Despite the fact 
that improving a nation’s competitiveness is frequently presented as a central goal of 
economic policy, arguments abound as to what this means and whether it is even sensible to 
talk of competitiveness at a macro-economic level at all. Two schools of thought can be 
identified in this regard: the management school that advocates the notion of national 
competitive advantage and the economic school, which denounce the presence of national 
competitiveness (Smit, 2010). 
 According to the management school, competitiveness is the underlying cause of why some 
social groups, economic institutions and nations advance and prosper; and the only 
meaningful factor of competitiveness at the national level is national productivity (Porter, 
1990).  Under this orientation, countries are seen as an aggregation of industries whose 
economic performance is determined by the competitiveness of those industries. Therefore, 
the industry is believed to be the appropriate level of analysis. The central question is whether 
a certain industry in a country has advantages in the global market and how to improve the 
competitiveness of the respective industry. In doing so, the management school of thought 
assumes that firm competitiveness can be extended to national level by portraying countries as 
somehow in competition with one another (Smit, 2010; Porter, 1990).  
Despite the fact that improving a nation’s productivity is the central purpose of every 
economic policy, the extension of firm level competition to national level has opened up the 
debate on the meaning and understanding of national competitiveness. According to the 
economic school of thought, the analogy between the firm and the nation is incorrect and 
therefore, the concept of national competitiveness is elusive (Krugman, 1994). The underlying 
assumption in economic theories is that companies of different nations rather than nations 
themselves are the ones in competition with each other. The argument sounds reasonable. 
However, Dunn (1994) argues that countries compet economically, though in a different way 
than corporations do. He contends that conventional economic theories fails to notice the 
geniune political character of competition when applied to national economies. Though his 
point of departure is completely different from Dunn (1994), Cho (1998) points out that 
competitiveness can be measured for any entity with different levels: product, firm, industry, 
nation, or the globe. He argues that in a strict sense it is not companies, but similar products 
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that directly compete against each other. He explains that at the business-unit level in a 
multidivisional firm, managers talk about the competitiveness and performance of individual 
products but the firm’s overall competitiveness depends often not on one particular product 
line but the entire portfolio of the products it produces (Cho, 1998). Similarly, an industry can 
be seen as a portfolio of firms within the industry and a nation as a portfolio of industries 
within the nation (Porter, 1990). Therefore, it is plausible to see competitiveness as a 
legitimate concern both at industry and national level in as much as it is at the product and 
firm level (Cho, 1998)  
In addition to the disagreement on the analogy between the firm and the nation, proponents of 
the economic school argue that countries do not go out of business as uncompetitive 
corporations may do (Krugman, 1994; Kay, 2005). However, Peterson (2005) refute this 
contention by pointing out those nations that ceased to exist due to their failure to remain 
economically competitive and militarily strong (the latter often being a function of the 
former). The Soviet Union, the Republic of South Vietnam, and Czechoslovakia are good 
examples in this regard (Peterson, 2005).  Li (2011) point out that the reasons why countries 
may not go out of business easily is simply because they can default their debts repayment 
when they become insolvent while corporations do not have that option. A good example he 
cited is Mexico in 1982. Thus, conceiving national competitiveness as meaningless simply 
because countries do not go out of business is irrational (Li, 2011; Peterson, 2005).  
A well‐established framework that can be used to analyze the competitiveness of nations is 
Porter’s (1990) diamond model, which builds on his earlier frameworks on competitive 
strategy (Porter, 1980) and competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). In his seminal book, Porter 
(1990) tries to build a bridge between the theoretical literatures in strategic management and 
international economics, and provides the basis for improved national policies on 
competitiveness (Pitelis, 2009). The main question Porter (1990) attempts to answer is why 
some countries are more successful in particular industries than others. According to him, the 
answer lies in differences in national competitiveness, which he defines as a function of 
national productivity. He argues that the standard of living in a country can be improved when 
industries in the country improve their productivity. In his diamond framework, he identifies 
four classes of country attributes that provide the underlying conditions for the determination 
of national competitiveness. These are factor conditions; demand conditions; related and 
supporting industries; and firm strategy, structure and rivalry. In addition to the four 
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determinants, he also proposes two other factors, namely government policy and chance 
(exogenous shocks), that complement or negate national competitiveness but do not create 
lasting competitive advantages.  
 
Figure 1- The diamond of national competitive advantage (Porter, 1990) 
The first determinant deals with a nation’s position in factors of production. Factor conditions 
have traditionally been defined as land, labor and capital. However, Porter (1990) argues that 
if factor conditions are to be useful in explaining competitiveness, they need to be defined at a 
much more disaggregated level than the simple trinity of land, labor and capital. He made 
distinction between basic factors such as unskilled labor, raw materials, climatic conditions 
and water resources that are inherited and require little or no new investment to be utilized 
and advanced factors such as skilled labor, infrastructure, sophisticated skills and 
knowledge, research facilities etc that are created and upgraded through reinvestment and 
innovation. He also distinguishes between generalized factors which can be deployed in a 
wide range of industries and specialized factors, which cannot. According to him, the 
advanced and specialized factors form the basis for the sustainable competitive advantage of a 
country, as  they  are  factors  whose supply  depends  on  investments  by  
individuals, companies and governments, not on exogenous  endowment. 
The other determinant considered by Porter (1990) is demand condition within the respective 
country. He pointed out that it is not only the size of the home demand that matters, but also 
the sophistication of home country buyers. It is the composition of home demand that shapes 
how firms perceive, interpret and respond to buyers’ needs. In line with this, he distinguishes 
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three attributes of a home demand condition that create initial and ongoing incentive for 
investment and innovation. First, a country’s industry benefits a lot in terms of 
competitiveness if the industry has its important market segment at home rather than 
elsewhere. Second, the presence of demanding and sophisticated buyers creates pressure on 
companies to meet the high expectations. Third, if the needs of buyers at home are capable 
enough to anticipate the needs of buyers in other countries, it gives a nation’s industries a lead 
in learning how to meet those needs ahead. He concludes that a domestic market that has 
these attributes enhance international competitiveness as these conditions force firms within a 
country to continually innovate and upgrade their competitive positions to meet the high 
standards in terms of product quality, features and service demands. 
The third element of the diamond deals with the presence of related and supporting industries. 
According to Porter (1990), a county’s industry becomes internationally competitive if the 
country’s economy accommodates strong clusters of industries which are linked to each other 
through vertical or horizontal relationships amongst competitive supplying and buying sectors 
or common customers, distribution channels or technologies. Porter (1998; 2000) argues that 
the external economies of scale associated with related and support industry clusters are the 
true source of competitive advantage. According to him, networks of specialized input 
providers, manufacturers of complementary products and companies in industries that are 
related by skills, technologies or common inputs support specialized suppliers, allow labor 
market pooling and help knowledge spill-over. He believes competitive clusters provide an 
environment in which learning, innovation and operating productivity can flourish and hence, 
they are among the most important influences on learning and eventually the ultimate source 
of many of the scarcest resources and capabilities of firms (Porter, 1998).  
The fourth determinant identified in the diamond is firm structure, strategy and 
rivalry in the home country between firms. Porter (1990) contends that the strategies and 
structures of firms are extremely dependent on national environment and that there are 
systematic differences in different countries that define the way firms compete in each 
country and ultimately their competitive advantage. Under this corner of the diamond, Porter 
(1990) identifies rivalry amongst domestic firms in the home country as the most decisive 
driver of competitive advantage of a country’s firms. According to him, competitive pressure 
amongst those in proximity to each other provides the dynamics that drives the search for 
internationally competitive products and practices. Domestic rivalry puts pressure on firms to 
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be cost competitive, to improve quality and to be innovative. As domestic firms are most 
visible to one another, the success of one firm shows the others that further development is 
possible in the local circumstances. Therefore, strong domestic rivalry can serve as a major 
spur to innovation and hence success in international competition.  
Chance and government are the two additional variables in the diamond framework. 
According to him, these factors could complement or negate national competitiveness but do 
not create lasting competitive advantages. Chance events refers to exogenous factors such as 
technological  discontinuities,  wars, global  shifts  or  political  decisions  by  foreign  
governments that are beyond the realms of firms’ sphere of influence. Such events are 
important because they have bearing on firms’ competitive position (Porter, 1990). With 
respect to government, Porter (1990) underlined that government 
can influence all four determinants and hence, has important role in the creation of 
international competitiveness by influencing the four determinants. The influence, however, 
could be bad or good depending on circumstances. For instance, government can play a 
positive role by stimulating competition, improving factor conditions such as infrastructure, 
education or by setting quality safety and environmental standards that have cross-industry 
benefit. He noted that government’s role is inevitably partial in a sense that it lacks the power 
to create national competitive advantage directly by itself.  
As Porter (1990) points out, the diamond framework is not static; rather it constitutes an 
interactive system in which elements influence each other. The effect of one determinant 
depends on the development of and interaction with the other determinants. The determinants 
reinforce each other and competitive advantage is created as this mutual reinforcement 
between the determinants proceeds. Using the findings from his studies carried out in ten 
different nations as a frame of reference, Porter (1990) makes a proposition stating that 
countries go through a series of stages in their industrial development, moving from the 
factor-driven stage, to the investment-driven stage, to the innovation driven stage, and finally 
to the wealth-driven stage. As a country moves from the factor-driven stage up in the 
hierarchy, the general standard of living within the respective country is assumed to improve 
irrespective of welfare distribution.  According to him, the industries which are successful in 
competition with those of other nations are those whose competitive strategies are appropriate 
for the country’s stage of development. In the factor-driven stage, successful companies 
compete on the basis of low-cost that comes from cheap labor or low cost natural resources. 
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Hence, in this stage the competitive advantage of such a nation comes from only the factor 
conditions. Factor conditions play an important role in the second stage as well. Even though 
industries are conceived as competing on cost at this stage, the cost advantage is achieved 
through scale economies and state-of-the-art manufacturing practices applied to mature 
products, rather than low wages. Hence, this stage is manifested by heavy investments such as 
in infrastructure and education. Unlike the first stage, competitive advantage is based on two 
more corners of the diamond, demand conditions and firm strategy, in addition to factor 
conditions. In the innovation-driven stage, competition takes place on the basis of both 
product and process innovation and hence, a nation needs to have strength in all corners of the 
diamond to get into this stage. It needs to continually improve and innovate so that it can stay 
at the forefront. When a country reaches a level where it can no longer innovate and improve 
on its productivity, it proceeds to the wealth-driven phase, in which it essentially lives on its 
past and goes into decline. In the wealth-driven phase, the country’s firms are run by 
stewards, rather than entrepreneurs. Belief in the value of competition is less intense as 
powerful firms seek protection through government policy. The motivation to innovate is 
reduced, employees become more interested in non-economic aspirations. All these will lead 
to mistaken government policies as national goals become more concerned with wealth 
distribution than wealth creation ( (Porter, 1990). 
Even though it is widely used as a frame of reference by academicians and practitioners, 
Porter’s (1990) diamond framework came under criticism. The framework came under is 
criticized for its failure to pay enough attention to the role of government in the diamond 
framework (Grant, 1991; de Man & Bosch, 1997). However, De Man & Bosch (1997) argue 
that most critics misunderstood the role government can play in Porter's framework. As they 
pointed out, the fact that it is seen as an influencing factor and not as a determinant does not 
mean that governmental policy has a negligible influence on the creation of national 
competitiveness. The other group of critics point to the failure of Porter (1990) to relate the 
role of government to the industry life cycle. Porter (1990) underlined that government plays 
a different role depending on the stages of national competitive development. However, he 
does not relate the impact industry life cycle can have on different phases of the national 
competitiveness. According to Van den Bosch & De Man (1997), the role of government 
should vary according to phases of the industry life cycle. It may need to be very active in the 
early phases of development, diminish in influence when the industry matures and may come 
back to play an important role in restructuring the industry in the decline phase. Incorporating 
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these extensions in the Porter’s framework would contribute to a more balanced 
understanding of the impact of government on competitiveness (de Man & Bosch, 1997). 
Another aspect of the diamond that attracted critics is Porter’s (1990) insistence that firms’ 
ability to compete depends largely upon the strength of the diamond in their home base and 
his assertion that national economic performance depends upon firms for whom the nation is 
the home base. Dunning (1992) argues that both of these assertions are inappropriate. He 
contends that a foreign MNE which locates its operations in a country can help local suppliers 
to improve and upgrade if it is more demanding than domestic firms. Likewise, the presence 
of foreign MNE may create opportunity for domestic firms to be aware of different consumer 
demands and thus stimulates the quality of demand in the home market. He also argues that it 
is illogical to suggest that the competitiveness of firms which have a large proportion of their 
operations outside their home solely depends on the strength of diamond in their home 
country. Thus, Dunning (1992) extended Porter’s diamond in such a way that it accounts for 
MNEs activity and influence. He therefore suggests MNEs be considered as a third exogenous 
variable in addition to government and chance. Even though they agree with Dunning’s 
(1992) argument, Rugman & D’Cruz (1993) disagree with the idea of considering MNEs as 
an exogeneous variable. They insist that Porter's framework needs to be adapted not only with 
respect to the MNEs’ but also with respect to the diamond of the countries that trades heavily 
with the focal country (Rugman & D’Cruz, 1993). According to them, the home base 
diamond analysis is incorrect for small, open economies that are highly interdependent with 
one or more countries. Due to this interdependency, proponents of the double diamond posit 
that the competitive strength of that country’s strategic clusters rests on their ability to draw 
on the other trading country’s diamond, learning from demanding foreign customers, using 
resources from both countries, and purchasing inputs from the supporting industries in both 
places. Hence, they insist that each country needs to set its own home-country diamond 
against the relevant trading country’s diamond (Rugman & D’Cruz, 1993). In addition to the 
afore-discussed criticism, Porter’s (1990) diamond has been criticized due to its limited 
analysis of the role of culture, the ambiguity regarding the correct geographical level and its 
interpretation of inward and outward FDI flow (de Man & Bosch, 1997).   
The discussion so far presents the conceptual perspectives that underpin the assumptions, 
premises, finding and critics about Porter’s (1990) diamond framework. As discussed above, 
the model provides a useful framework to identify a country’s sources of competitive 
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advantage that firms can use to enhance their competitive positions internationally. It is useful 
in analyzing locations as a source of international competitive advantage for firms. However, 
as the critics indicate, the framework becomes more comprehensive when the role of other 
trading countries local conditions is taken into account. In line with this, in this study the 
double diamond framework approach is used as a frame of reference to analyze the 
competitiveness of the Ethiopian flower industry. Hence the framework is applied to the 
Ethiopian flower industry in such a way that the diamond of Ethiopia’s most trading region, 
Europe in general, is taken into account in addition to the condition within the Ethiopian 
economy. It should, however, be noted that the determinants from European diamond are 
considered when they are found to be significantly important in influencing the Ethiopian 
flower industry. Otherwise, the focus is on the Ethiopian flower industry. Besides, the 
association of the Ethiopian flower industry with its European counterpart is conceived not in 
the sense of creation of competitive advantage, rather in the sense of creating competitive 
parity with other competing countries that have access to the European flower industry.  
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3  Methodological approach and description of data 
3.1 Research design and approach 
In order to comprehensively study the issue at national level, it would be ideal if the study 
was designed in such a way that it uncovers the trends and structure of FDI in the Ethiopian 
Flower Industry and the competitiveness of the sector as intensively and extensively as 
possible. However, as academic literature, data and information about the Ethiopian 
floriculture is limited, it would be difficult to have the ground to explore further in 
explanatory manner. For this reason, this study is designated to be descriptive in its nature. 
Apart from this, to broadly describe the issue in a more credible way, data from as many 
sources as possible should be pooled for making insightful analysis. To this effect, this study 
employed a mixture of methodologies with the aim of triangulation. In line with this, one way 
methodological triangulation that relates to the collection of data from different sources such 
as government organisations; UNCTAD, flower producers’ association; individual growers 
and exporters is employed with the aim of uncovering plurality not observable when using a 
single source. Government sources are expected to provide information regarding the 
government’s policy and national statistics regarding the sector whereas individual producers 
and exporters provide insight from the growers’ point of view. The UNCTAD data in its part 
provides the statistics of the Ethiopian flower export value as reported by the importing 
countries.  
3.2 Sampling and data gathering methods  
In conducting any kind of study, it is important to make preliminary assessment of the issue 
under consideration from existing academic literature and other secondary sources. In line 
with this, I conducted desk research involving a general assessment of global and floral 
industry in general and Ethiopian flower industry in particular as a first stage of the study. 
Hence, before embarking on fieldwork, I did an extensive reading of the existing literature 
and other secondary sources. In the process of doing this, it became evident to me that there is 
very little academic work and publications on the Ethiopian floriculture. I could not find much 
of the data on Ethiopia’s macro-economic statistics in general and the country’s flower 
industry in particular readily available from secondary sources. This made my fieldwork a 
necessity as such statistics and data had to be sought from the respective industry’s 
associations, private and government actors in the country. In spite of the limited literature 
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and secondary sources, I have tried to tap as much data and information as possible from 
already existing literature and secondary data sources. 
The second stage in the data collection process involved the collection of primary data from 
the governmental and industry sources in Ethiopia. As mentioned in the research design 
section, I sought data from different sources. As far as the selection of respondents from the 
respective sources is concerned, I used different approaches according to the data source used. 
Regarding government offices and other public actors such as National Investment Agency, 
Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency and the Ethiopian Horticultural Producers and 
Exporters Association (EHPEA), I used purposive sampling to target those officials and 
experts that are directly dealing with the flower industry. When it comes to selecting 
individual flower producers, I used convenience sampling in order to include accessible and 
willing owner/managers of the farms. In line with this, I targeted managers/owners of flower 
producers that are located nearby to Addis Ababa or along the main road from Addis Ababa 
to Hawassa City.  
As far as data collection is concerned, I used different data gathering techniques. In the 
collection of data from government and other public sources, I have relied on the analysis of 
policy documents, reports and publications related to the floral industry and the national 
economy. Thus, reports from the Ethiopian Investment Agency, the Ethiopian Horticulture 
Development Agency, the Association of Horticulture Producers, the Ethiopian Revenue and 
Custom Authority have been explored. The report from the Ethiopian Horticulture 
Development Agency and the Association of Horticulture Producers provide general 
information regarding the flower industry in Ethiopia whereas the reports from the Ethiopian 
Investment Agency and the Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority provided the FDI and 
export data in the sector respectively. In an effort to triangulate the data, I used indirect export 
data (mirror data) as reported by importing countries from the database of UNCTAD. In 
addition to the reports from these organizations, I conducted in depth semi-structured 
interviews with officers/experts from Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency and the 
Association of Horticulture Producers. I was not able to do this with National Investment 
Agency officers. I was rather provided with the relevant data.  
I preferred to use interview in collecting data from the officers mainly due to its advantage in 
uncovering and clarifying things insightfully and exhaustively which would otherwise be 
difficult to get using questionnaire. The semi-structured nature of the interview allowed 
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adapting the questions in such a way that they would include issues and aspects which I had 
not considered before the interview but had become evident and important during the course 
of the interview. With respect to flower producers, I planned to administer questionnaire to at 
least 30 flower producers. However, this was not possible mainly due to the unwillingness of 
the flower producers. This eventually reduced the actual number of flower producers who 
took part in the study to 26. In addition to this, I planned to conduct semi-structured interview 
with managers/owners of some producers in order to get more insight on the sector. I 
managed to get only five farm managers who were willing to be interviewed. The data 
collected from primary sources and the information extracted from secondary sources are 
presented at various points in chapter six, seven and eight in such a way that it fits to the 
analytical framework developed in the previous chapter.  
3.3 Reliability and Validity of the study 
Though reliability and validity are prominent to a quantitative perspective, they are as much 
relevant to qualitative studies as well (Babbie, 2007; Bryan, Teevan, & J., 2005). However, 
due to the inherent difference between the two approaches in terms of measurement, 
epistemological foundation and ontological considerations, Bryan & Teevan (2005, ss. 148-
151) argues that the meaning of research reliability and validity needs alteration to fit the 
qualitative discourse. In this regard, Lincoln and Guba (1994) proposed four qualitative 
research criteria – credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability, each of which 
have equivalent criteria in quantitative research - internal validity, external validity, reliability 
and objectivity respectively.  
The credibility criteria in qualitative approach refer to whether the results of qualitative 
research are believable. This goes in line with the criteria of internal validity, which refers to 
the extent to which a study’s results can be accurate in quantitative approach. Transferability 
deals with how well the results of a research can be generalized to other contexts. This in 
qualitative research refers to external validity - the extent to which the results of a study can 
be generalized to other situations and to other people. In qualitative research, transferability 
can be enhanced by describing the research context and the assumptions that were central to 
the research thoroughly, so that other researchers who may want to transfer the results to a 
different context can make reasonable judgment of how sensible the transfer is (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994).  
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The third criteria, dependability is analogous to reliability in quantitative researche. In 
quantitative approach, reliability refers to whether it is possible to obtain the same results if 
the research is repeated. In order to enhance this, dependability criteria in qualitative research 
calls for the need for the researcher to account for the ever-changing context within which 
research occurs and how these changes affect the way the research is conducted. The fourth 
criteria, confirmability, refer to the degree to which the results could be corroborated by 
others. It is analogous to objectivity in quantitative research, which emphasizes that the 
findings of a study should depend on the nature of what is studied rather than on the 
personality, beliefs and values of the researcher. One way to enhance this is to document the 
procedures for checking and rechecking the data throughout the study so that others can 
conduct a data audit that examines the data collection and analysis procedures and makes 
judgements about the potential for bias or distortion (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  
These four set of criteria are assumed as a point of reference to ensure this study’s reliability 
and validity. In line with this, I used one way methodological triangulation that relates to the 
use of different data sources to enhance the credibility of the study. With respect to 
dependability, all phases of the study ranging from methodological choice and selection of 
sample cases to interview transcripts and data analysis procedures have not only been clearly 
sorted out but also strictly followed as much as possible. I presented all respondents with a set 
of questions that are developed in such a way that they show a good match with the research 
questions and the study’s analytical framework. The questionnaire is presented in the 
appendix part. It should, however, be noted that I have adjusted the interview questions to fit 
the formal role of respondents when needed. Though the interviews were recorded in 
Amharic, I have translated them to English. As I am not professional translator, this may pose 
an issue. I tried to reduce the potential error by consulting other native speakers of the local 
language to check the accuracy of the translation. 
Likewise, in order to enhance the transferability of the findings, the selection of individual 
producers and exporters was proposed to be conducted in such a way that the resultant 
samples are diversified enough to represent the whole industry. However, this was not 
conducted as planned, partly due to the unwillingness of some flower producing firms to 
participate in the study and partly due to constraints in terms of limited time and financial 
resource. The unwillingness of some flower producers to participate in the study may 
introduce a selection bias and thereby, have implication on the representativeness of the 
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respondents. This may cast question on the transferability of the study’s findings. Without 
sufficient firm specific data, I found it difficult to assess how this would play in affecting the 
study’s outcome as it is difficult to tell the size and characteristics of individual firms. 
However, I expect that it would not have a magnified implication as some of those growers 
who declined for interview were willing to participate in filling the questionnaire. In addition, 
according to Lincoln and Guba (1994) transferability can be enhanced by doing a thorough 
job of describing the research context and providing thick description of the issue under 
consideration. In line with this, I have tried to give as much care as possible to make the 
collected data and analysis as comprehensive and insightful as possible so that it would 
provide a database for making reasonable judgments about the Ethiopian flower industry. In 
reference to the fourth criteria, dependability, Lincoln and Guba (1994)  stress the need to 
account for the ever-changing context within which the research is conducted. In line with 
this, in the section to follow a thorough description of the changes that occur in the setting and 
how these changes affected the way I approached the study is provided along with other 
practical issues.  
3.4 Practical and ethical issues during field work 
The prime overriding issue that I encountered during the field survey was access to 
respondents and to data. As it turned out, I did not find the data collection process as smooth 
as I expected and hence, in some circumstances, I needed to alter the fieldwork approach and 
instrument. The first challenge in this regard is in relation to the collection of data from 
governmental and other public sources. Except in the Ethiopian Investment Agency, where 
predefined rules about how and which data would be released are set clearly and where the 
employees are very friendly, the process of data obtaining was too bureaucratic from other 
offices. Often, offices had to be visited repeatedly to get the respective officers with the 
authority to permit the release of data. In some circumstances, it was found difficult to 
convince and get the cooperation of officers. This emanates from the nature of the 
bureaucracy existing in Ethiopia. Due to the existing domineering government culture, a great 
number of Ethiopian officers are both somewhat reluctant and hence, careful in the 
information they provide. Even in those circumstances where they are willing to cooperate, 
sometimes it was difficult to get the kind of data designated as such data may not be readily 
available.  
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I encountered a more pressing challenge when collecting data from individual producers. 
Resistance by individual firms was expected from the very beginning as any private 
businesses in any industry naturally tend to protect the release of any data that could 
compromise its competitive position. However, the case with some of the flower producers 
was even more serious and difficult. Therefore, there were a number of circumstances I was 
denied of getting data and response. The hesitation of the flower producers to get involved in 
the study is related to the claim by some recent studies regarding the environmental 
implication and workers welfare in the Ethiopian flower industry. According to some studies, 
workers’ welfare and the environmental impact of the industry are on the stake in the 
Ethiopian flower industry (Tilahun, 2012; Haug, Ingrid, Jens, & Suma, 2008; Tadele, 2009; 
Nigatu, 2010). Owing to this, a number of flower growers were reluctant to grant access to 
information fearing that the information they give out would result in similar allegation 
against their business. This eventually reduced the number of flower growers included in the 
study significantly.  Even in those circumstances where cooperation was attained, they were 
not willing to share information they thought were sensitive and hence, I was unable to collect 
as much data as desired. This may have a bearing on the triangulation designed in the study as 
the absence of sufficient data from these sources affects the insightfulness of the study.  
Putting aside these challenges, another issue that came to light during the field survey is 
ethical considerations in relation to the anonymity of respondents. Due to the sensitiveness of 
the sector owing to the afore-discussed reasons, it has always been difficult to get cooperation 
from most of the data sources in general, the flower growers in particular, especially when the 
respondents are employed managers, not owners. Indeed, their concern is understandable. The 
disclosure of their identity or position or even company in any way has a potential bearing on 
their professional career. As a matter of fact, keeping respondents’ identity anonymous was 
the basic ethical consideration underlined in the planning stage of the field survey not only 
because this was necessary to convince data sources but also as a moral imperative to make 
sure that respondents won’t be affected due to their participation in the study. In line with this, 
assurance was given to all respondents that their identity would be kept anonymous 
throughout the study. It should however be noted that in the analysis and interpretation stage, 
it may be necessary to refer to the position of the respondents to provide context regarding the 
information they gave. In such circumstances, their position is referred without mentioning 
their personal background and institutional affiliation.  
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4 The Global Cut Flower Industry - Consumption, Demand and 
Production Patterns 
Consumers buy flowers because of traditions, culture and lifestyle. Unlike other agricultural 
commodities that are needed to satisfy nutritional or energy requirements, flowers are sought 
to satisfy emotional and aesthetic needs. Even though they are extremely perishable as is the 
case with most agricultural products, flowers are a very special class of commodities in a 
sense that their intrinsic value, which comes from their use in satisfying emotional and 
aesthetic need, differs from that of most other agricultural commodities. This makes the 
market for flowers an interesting and challenging object for economic analysis (Steen, 2010).  
The culture of using flowers as good gestures and gifts to express emotions, beautify 
environs, conduct rituals and commemorate observances has existed for many centuries. 
However, the emergence of floriculture as an industry has been driven largely by the 
consumption habits of the ruling nobilities and upper class people in urban centres of Western 
Europe in the 19
th
 century. In the first half of 19
th
 century, floriculture was started in England 
where flowers were grown on a large scale basis on vast estates (Goody, 1993). The 
Netherlands then emerged as main producer in Europe by the early 1900’s mainly due to its 
flat and fertile land, and proximity to the growing market in continental Europe (Hortiwise; 
FlowerWatch , 2012).  
Before the 1960’s, demand for cut flowers was predominantly met by local production. 
However, as transportation systems developed in Europe, the landscape changed remarkably. 
Expedited movements enabled the distribution of cut flowers grown in one country to other 
countries within Europe (Hortiwise; FlowerWatch , 2012). In 1973 when the world energy 
crisis occurred, producers in northern Europe became under competitive pressure because cut 
flower production became more expensive for northern growers relative to southerners due to 
increased energy costs
1
. Thus, increasingly larger quantities of cut flowers were grown in 
southern Europe to meet the demand in Northern and Central Europe. This development 
needed an efficient floricultural trading hub-network through which flowers are distributed 
from the Southern Europe to the Central and Northern Europe. With its pioneering auction 
system, important logistical hubs, its proximity to Europe’s 500 million consumers plus the 
                                                          
 
1
 Energy cost for the production of flowers in Europe constitutes one of the major cost aspects due to the need 
for controlled temperature in greenhouses during the winter season. 
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development of high-quality production and distribution methods, the Netherlands appeared 
to be the perfect candidate to be at the heart of the budding European floriculture business 
(Hortiwise; FlowerWatch , 2012; Wernett, 1998). Since then, it became a global trendsetter 
and undisputed international market leader. The vast majority of commercial cut flowers go 
through the Netherlands’ well-established flower auctions if not been grown in the country 
(Taylor, 2011).  
Fuelled by economic growth and cultural characteristics in the Dutch and German-speaking 
countries, the European flower market transformed from immature to emerging and 
eventually to matured market in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The market expansion was so massive 
that it grew at annual double-digit growth rates. The demand for a year-round supply, which 
triggered cut flower production in non-traditional production sites such as Israel, Africa and 
South America, emerged during this period. In about the same period, the European flower 
industry was able to influence flower production and sales in North America. Although 
production of flower began in the USA following European settlement, production was on 
small scale to supply the populace of nearby cities and towns. However, the introduction of 
European flowers through the Dutch flower auctions system in the 1970’s has influenced the 
sector remarkably. Through dedicated promotion activities in the USA, the European flower 
producers led by the Netherlands were able to motivate Americans to purchase more cut 
flowers for gifts, occasions and everyday use, similar to consumer habits in Europe. Hence, it 
didn’t take long for the European flower producers to gain significant share of the budding US 
market (Wernett, 1998). In the late 1980’s, attracted by the growth of Asian economies, the 
European flower industry sought to expand in Asia. Initially European growers started 
commercial floriculture production in Southeast Asia to meet the increasing need for low cost 
flowers by the European cut flower market. However, as the economies of Asian countries 
boom, European growers sought to tap the opportunity by using their already established 
production in Asia. Using Japan as starting point, European growers were able to swiftly 
move and strengthen their position in the Asian lucrative market. The Dutch auctions system 
served to redistribute the Southeast Asian production to the Japanese and other Asian markets 
(Wernett, 1998).  
Over the last few decades, notable changes occurred in the cut flower industry in relation to 
demand, production and distribution (van Uffelen & de Groot, 2005; van Liemt, 1999). With 
respect to demand, strong economic indicators in the 1980s and 1990s made the consumption 
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of flowers grow steadily. Flowers have regularly been demanded by middle and upper-income 
homes. In addition, as companies, events and recreations start to use more flowers for 
ornamental purpose, the institutional consumption has also increased. Consequently, global 
consumption demonstrated a tremendous growth between 1980’s and the mid 2000’s (GIA, 
2012; van Uffelen & de Groot, 2005). It should however be noted that consumption is 
concentrated in North America, Western Europe and Japan. Western Europe accounts for over 
half of the world cut flower consumption and on individual country basis, the United States, 
Japan and Germany are the three largest single markets in their respective order (van Uffelen 
& de Groot, 2005). Even though the sale of flowers was initially expected to go on increasing, 
the recent global economic crisis took its toll on the market as sales of flowers withered. 
Though the downturn had implication for the flower demand, it did not completely halt the 
market growth. Global flower market witnessed a positive growth in 2010, after relative 
decline in earlier years. There is a general feeling that the demand in Western Europe and 
other mature markets faces a period of stagnation with moderate growth. However, the 
economic boom in growing and emerging economies is expected to keep the momentum in 
the global demand for flowers, even against the background of the turbulence in matured 
markets. In this regard, Asia and Eastern Europe have big potential as emerging markets due 
to rising prosperity (GIA, 2012; Hortiwise; FlowerWatch , 2012).  
With respect to production pattern, the industry’s production chain was traditionally 
structured close to major markets, European and the US flower markets, with Netherlands 
being not only the main trade-hub but also major producer in the world. However, overtime 
this structure has changed remarkably as the industry players react to increased globalisation, 
the change in consumer tastes, development of advanced transport services, and lower labour 
costs, availability of land, good climatic conditions and year-round production in the southern 
developing countries (van Liemt, 1999; Labaste, 2005; DEFRA, 2007). In line with this, 
relocation of flower production from traditional hubs in the Northern hemisphere such as 
Western Europe and North America towards countries where climatic conditions are more 
favourable and production and labour costs are lower has become recurrent  in the global 
flower industry (Rikken, 2010; van Liemt, 1999). This shift in production occurred in 
evolutionary process. Initially it came in lower-quality, higher-volume varieties where the 
knowledge and skill requirements for optimum production were lower. This made traditional 
producers in matured markets focus on the high-value varieties where, being proximate to the 
market, they could be more responsive to consumer demand and take flowers to market in 
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optimum sale condition without considerations of perishability during transit. In due course, 
as production capabilities improved, production centres in developing countries were able to 
produce the high-value varieties at a greatly reduced cost. This eventually narrowed the scope 
of producers in the traditional production hubs to those varieties which are most easily 
damaged in transit, or can be easily produced without energy or labour inputs (Tanya & lga, 
2007; Taylor, 2011). Consequently, in a slowly but steadily growing manner, developing 
countries such as Colombia, Kenya, Ecuador and Ethiopia are gaining market share in place 
of traditional producers (Rikken, 2010).  
The value chain of flower industry is affected not only from production perspective but also 
from marketing and distribution aspects as well. The industry is evolving towards lean and 
transparent distribution chains. Direct trade channels, bypassing the auction system, are 
growing. As transactions are increasingly handled by means of computer systems, an 
acceleration of technology and knowledge development in the way flowers are traded is 
witnessed. Further down in the downstream activities, distribution of flowers is becoming 
virtual as wholesalers are offering products online (Rikken, 2010). Likewise, as major 
supermarkets seek greater involvement in floriculture in search of economies of scale and 
greater influence over the nature and timing of production, the traditional distribution 
structure is evolving into a dual structure with, some distribution channels controlled by 
independent florists and others distribution channels are controlled by mass retailers (such as 
supermarkets chains) (Labaste, 2005; Taylor, 2011). While most of the product used to go to 
outlets like independent florists and local stores, lately supermarket chains and garden centers 
have become influential with their high and specific demands. Such changes in the marketing 
channels are making flowers more readily available to consumers at lower prices (van Uffelen 
& de Groot, 2005). So as to cope up with the increasing demands of supermarkets for 
affordability, quality audits, labels and certificates, market actors in the upstream distribution 
chains such as wholesalers and importers have started co-operating with growers very closely 
(Taylor, 2011).  
Nowadays, the flower industry is truly global. International production and trade is largely 
organised along regional lines. It is dominated by south-north flows with Europe and North-
America housing the world’s largest consumer markets while the major producing countries 
are situated in low latitude countries. In line with this, African and European countries are the 
principal suppliers to the main European markets; the North-American cut flower market is 
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mainly supplied by Colombia and Ecuador; and Asian markets source primarily from Asia-
Pacific countries (Hortiwise; FlowerWatch , 2012).  
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5 Ethiopia’s Political and Economic context 
Ethiopia is a nation with a long and complex history. It is one of the ancient countries in the 
world with a long history of independent statehood even during the African colonization. In 
the last four decades, it went through major political transformations ranging from a feudal 
system to socialist and more recently to federal government. Before the 1974 revolution, the 
established aristocracy and the majority of peasants (tenants) constitute the major socio-
economic agents. Land was the critical resource, the control of which was important for any 
group that aspires for power. It was controlled by the feudal lords whose livelihood depended 
on exploiting the peasants (Geda, 2007). Even though there were attempts to modernize 
during the imperial regime, the initiatives failed to respond to meet the societal demands for 
change. As a result, the long standing feudal dynastic rule was overthrown in 1974 by 
revolutionary upheavals. The revolution gave rise to the military dictatorship known as the 
Derg.  
Soon after its rise to power, the military government introduced a socialist economic system. 
It undertook a wide range of political, economic, and social reforms that revolve around the 
socialist principles of extensive state ownership and control, large-scale regulation of 
economic activities and restrictive economic policies. To its credit, it not only declared 
nationalisation of land that automatically ended tenancy but also equality among the country’s 
ethnicities and religions, and plurality in the use of languages. However, some of these 
reforms were not translated into practice. Among the unfulfilled promises, ethnicity served as 
both resource and product for the mobilisation of armed insurgency against the military 
regime in the 1970s and 1980s by a number of opposition groups (Vaughan, 2003). In the 
economic front, the Marxist economic policies coupled with the debilitating civil war grinded 
down the country's economic performance. Between 1974 and 1990, growth slowed down 
from what it was during the imperial regime. As a result, between 1975 and 1990 Ethiopia's 
economy was turning down, with an average GDP growth of 2.3% and per capita GDP 
growth of -0.4%. During the last year of the military government, GDP declined by 5 % in 
real terms with extreme level of inflation, defence expenditures accounted for 40 to 60 % of 
the national budget, merchandise exports fell to their lowest level since 1974 and a collapse in 
international coffee prices reduced foreign-exchange reserves to an all-time low (Geda, 2007; 
Philibert, 2001).  
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In 1991, the Derg was ousted by a coalition of rebel groups led by Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), an umbrella organization of ethnic-based 
organizations under the control of Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Under the new 
regime, Ethiopia implemented ethnic based federalized constitution that guarantees, at least in 
principle, regular democratic parliamentary elections accessible to all citizens (EFDR, 1994). 
According to the new makeup, government policies are deemed to centre on ethnicities and 
the federal parliament is, in theory, the highest organ of political power. However, in practice 
real power has vested in the hands of the architects of the system. The EPRDF in general, the 
inner circle elites of TPLF in particular have been governing the country as omnipotent and 
omnificent since they took power in 1991 (Abbink, 2006; Vaughan, 2003; Adegehe, 2009).  
In the economic front, the country’s economic condition coupled with the international 
collapse of communism and the global rise of neo-liberalism necessitated a nationwide 
structural and institutional reform. In line with this, the incumbent government showed a 
political will to move from a planned to capitalist economy by ostensibly adopting the 
Structural Adjustment Program prescribed by IMF and World Bank.  The program revolved 
around privatization of state-owned enterprises, liberalization of trade policies, devaluation 
and deregulation of prices and foreign exchange. With these reforms, the Ethiopian economy 
has been going through a slow process of economic reform and liberalization over the past 
two decades. It should however be noted that the compliance of the incumbent government 
with the reform policies has been less so in practice than in rhetoric (Philibert, 2001).  
After a period of sporadic experience in the 1990’s, Ethiopia has experienced strong 
economic growth over the past decade. With real GDP growth at or near double digit levels 
since 2003/04, the country’s economy has expanded much faster than most other countries in 
Africa (World Bank, 2013). In 2012/13, the economy has continued repeating the high-growth 
trajectory of the previous 10 years. In the 2012/13 fiscal year, Ethiopia’s economy grew by 
9.7%, the eleventh year in a row of robust growth. Average annual real GDP growth rate for 
the last decade was around 10.9%. In 2013/14 fiscal year, the country’s GDP reached over 47 
billion USD with per capita income of 558 US dollars while inflation decreased relative to 
prior years (MFED, 2014). Growth has been broad-based, with the industry sector growing at 
higher rate than agriculture and services sectors. Although the structure of the economy has 
changed in favour of industry and service sectors over the last few years, the change has been 
evolving at slower rate than planned (MFED, 2014). This growth momentum is expected to 
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continue in the coming years, albeit at a slower pace (IMF, 2014; World Bank, 2013). The 
country’s exports have also been growing strongly, averaging about 25.1 percent per annum 
between 2003/04 and 2009/10 (ADBG, 2010). Ethiopia's major traditional exports include 
coffee, oil seeds, gold, chat, pulses, and live animals (MFED, 2014). While coffee remains the 
largest source of merchandize export earnings, non-traditional agricultural exports have 
registered faster growth. The flower industry is a case in point. Flower exports have expanded 
from less than a million USD in 2004 to close to USD 165 million in 2013 (ERCA, 2014). 
External sources such as the International Trade Centre report that it is nearly USD 230 
million (ITC, 2014).  As a result, the share of non-coffee exports increased considerably. With 
imports rising faster than exports, the deficit in balance of trade increased significantly over 
the years. Consequently, the capacity of export earnings to cover import bills had declined 
(ADBG, 2014).  
With all the reform endeavours and recent performances, it is clear that the Ethiopian 
economy is going through a process of economic liberalization and revival. In the years 
ahead, the country is projected to keep on being among the fastest growing non-oil producing 
economies in Africa (IMF, 2014; World Bank, 2013; ADBG, 2014). However, the 
government’s strong involvement in the economic sector casts question. As opposed to its 
initial rhetoric towards the market mechanism, in recent years the government opted to a 
state-led development model that emphasizes extensive state participation in the economy 
(ADBG, 2014; ADBG, 2010). The government has been recommended to limit its 
involvement in the economy (IMF, 2014). However, the statuesque does not seem to change. 
State-owned enterprises and political ruling-party owned enterprises dominate the economic 
landscape, reducing room for the private sector to flourish. The government still retains 
control over the utilities sector, as well as telecoms, and prohibits foreign ownership of 
banking, insurance, and financial services and does not seem to have the appetite to make 
change on any of these sectors (US, 2014; ADBG, 2014).  It is within this post-communist 
context that the Ethiopian floriculture industry has emerged. Hence, the ideology and policies 
the incumbent government pursue are of paramount significance to the growth of the 
floriculture industry. In line with this, a thorough review and evaluation of the current 
government policies towards the flower industry are done in the analysis part in section 8.1.5. 
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6 The Ethiopian Flower Industry 
6.1 Development of the Flower Industry in Ethiopia 
Although flower production as a commercial undertaking is relatively new to Ethiopia’s 
economy, within a short period of time it emerged as one of the main sources of foreign 
exchange for the country. The origin of the sector in Ethiopia can be traced back to the 
military government. In 1980, the military government established the Horticulture 
Development Corporation with the primary objective of generating foreign exchange 
earnings. The corporation had the mandate to coordinate production and marketing of 
horticultural products including flowers. In line with this, production and export of summer 
flowers was started for the first time in 1981/82 on state farms with high subsidy from the 
government. However, the inefficient production did not stay long (Joosten, 2007). After the 
fall of the Derg regime, the industry re-emerged in the mid 1990s as a result of private 
initiative. Two local companies named Ethioﬂora and Meskel Flower pioneered production 
(open field) of summer flower. The two companies were able to export flowers. However, 
they were not as such successful mainly due to the unfavorable investment climate, their 
limited experience and knowledge about the business (Gebreeyesus & Iizuka, 2010).  
However, the embryonic effort of the two companies was able to attract attention from 
international actors such as the EU, the UK and the Netherlands who saw the flower industry 
as a potential sector to be nurtured. The EU collaborated with the Ethiopian government to 
commission preliminary production in the late 1990s on half a hectare of land. The objective 
was to investigate the available inputs and climatic conditions and thereby develop marketing 
strategies for large scale commercial undertakings. In the same way, the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DfID) conducted a number of feasibility studies aimed at locating 
potential flower production areas to supply to the UKs’ supermarket chains. Similarly, a 
business delegation from the Netherlands visited Ethiopia to examine the potential of growing 
flowers that would be supplied through the Dutch auction system to the European market 
(Taylor, 2011). The involvement of these foreign governments contributed to the international 
awareness of the Ethiopian flower industry. Subsequently, a number of foreign investors 
began to set up flower farms in Ethiopia. Golden Roses, a subsidiary of RINA Investment - an 
Indian family business based in the UK, is the first foreign firm to enter Ethiopia in 1999. It 
was able to produce roses for export under wooden greenhouses the same year and by 2000, it 
expanded its production scale using modern greenhouse technology (Taylor, 2011; Taylor, 
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2010). In spite of the effort by the pioneering Meskel Flower and Ethio-Flora to lay the 
foundations for flower production in Ethiopia, Golden Rose is considered as pioneer within 
the Ethiopian flower industry by many industry players, mainly because it introduced modern 
technology such as steel greenhouses (Gebreeyesus & Iizuka, 2010).  
In 2002, after years of struggle, the Ethiopian Horticultural Producers and Exporters 
Association (EHPEA) was formed as a non-profit organization representing growers. The 
association was instrumental in lobbying for government support in terms of infrastructure, 
loan and logistics services for the industry (EHPEA, 2014). Despite the early efforts of the 
association, the government’s role was limited until the mid 2000s. Indeed, the government 
was unaware of the sector’s potential and thus, it did not mention the flower industry among 
the extended list of priority sectors in the export promotion strategy it adopted in 1998 
(Gebreeyesus & Sonobe, 2011). Following the recommendation of the EU and other 
international consultants, the government started to make efforts ranging from creating 
conducive investment environments to granting incentives to attract foreign investors. In 
addition, the government also enhanced its effort to initiate international cooperation in 
matters relating to the flower industry (Taylor, 2011).  
 
Source – Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority (ERCA, 2014) 
Figure 2 - Value of Ethiopian flower export 
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Table 1 Value of African flower export in millions USD 
Exporters Exported value 
in 2009, US 
Dollar millions 
Exported 
value in 
2010, US 
Dollar 
millions  
Exported 
value in 
2011, US 
Dollar 
millions 
Exported 
value in 
2012, US 
Dollar 
millions 
Exported 
value in 
2013, US 
Dollar 
millions 
World 
export 
share in 
2013 
Share in 
African 
Export in 
2013 
World  7,316 7,579 9,073 8,930 9,199 100 % 
 Africa - - 766 934 927 10.1 % 100 % 
East African 
Community 436 - 475 635 655 7.1 % 71 % 
Kenya 421 396 454 601 641 7.0 % 69 % 
Ethiopia 132 144 169 166 165 1.8 % 18 % 
Tanzania 19 16 14 37 14 0.2 % 2 % 
South Africa 26 32 32 44 33 0.4 % 4 % 
Source - The International Trade Centre (ITC, 2014) 
In line with that, the number of flower firms licensed by the Ethiopian Investment Authority 
started to increase since the early 2000s. Before the government’s inducements, the industry 
was dominated by a handful of producers that regularly exported to the auctions in the 
Netherlands (Taylor, 2011). The number of firms started to rise rapidly after the incentives. 
By the year 2014, the number of firms reached more than 120 from a handful of firms in the 
late 1990s (EHPEA, 2014). In the same way, the total cultivated area of floriculture has 
shown astonishing growth over the years. It has grown from 40 hectares in 2002 to 1618 
hectares in 2014 (EHPEA, 2014). Consequently, flower production and export went through a 
remarkable growth from year to year both in terms of value and volume over the past decade. 
As can be seen from Figure 2, the export growth was exponential from 2004 to 2011. During 
this time, it grew from less than a million USD to 167 million USD (ERCA, 2014). The sector 
was able to grow even during the recent global financial crisis which reduced global demand 
for flowers.  This is not to say that the Ethiopian flower producers were not completely 
affected by the financial crisis. Even though its export slowed down, the Ethiopian flower 
industry managed to maintain positive annual growth throughout the crisis years. According 
to Taylor (2011), the growth of the Ethiopian flower industry’s export occurred not only as a 
result of rising demand in existing markets and the opening up of new markets but more 
importantly due to the capturing of market share from other exporting countries such as 
Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda (Taylor, 2011; Joosten, 2007). Consequently, 
Ethiopia emerged as one of the prominent flower exporters from a negligible player in the 
global flower industry within a short period of time. Despite its late entry into the flower 
business, the country is now the second largest African exporter to the EU next to Kenya 
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(CBI, 2013). According to Workman (2014), the country needed only five years to achieve 
what Kenya achieved in 30 years and given the current pace of the industry’s growth, it is 
expected to overtake Kenya in the coming few years.  
At a country level, the contribution of flower export to the overall country-level export grew 
remarkably from extremely insignificant ten years before to more than 5% in 2013. When 
compared to the country’s major export item, coffee, flower contribution grew much faster. 
Even though coffee is still by far the major contributor to export (around 24% of the export 
value), its relative contribution has showed a declining trend over the years. As opposed to 
this, the relative contribution of flower export grew remarkably. Even though the total 
cultivated area for horticulture is limited given the country’s immense potential, the 
horticulture sector, which is dominated by flower production, is currently the 5
th
 foreign 
revenue earner to the Ethiopian economy next to coffee, pulses & oil seeds, gold and chat. 
Within the horticulture sector, the flower industry contributes 80% of the sector’s foreign 
revenue although it accounts for only 11% of the developed horticulture land (ERCA, 2014). 
Given the performance of the sector so far and the government’s plan of generating $1bn 
export annually from the flower industry by the end of the decade, the flower industry’s 
contribution to export is expected to overtake coffee’s contribution in the near future (Van der 
Ploeg, 2009). In terms of employment, the industry currently employs more than 180 
thousand people directly, out of which 85% are women. Albeit optimistic, the Ethiopian 
Horticultural Producers and Exporters Association (EHPEA) projects a further 200,000 
people to have been benefiting from the industry indirectly (EHPEA, 2014). 
Comparison of the export data from the Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority to the 
mirror data (reported imports by Ethiopia’s trading partners) from the International Trade 
Centre raises caution. As can be seen from Figure 3 and Table 2, there is significant 
discrepancy between the two data sources over the years with the mirror data from the 
International Trade Centre always exceeding the direct data from the Ethiopian Revenue and 
Custom Authority. Although the size of the discrepancy between the two data sources was 
extremely high in the early 2000s, it showed decreasing trend until 2007 at which point it 
registered the lowest discrepancy. After 2007, the gap has started to increase continuously 
from year to year until it reached 39% in 2013.  
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Table 2: Difference between reported direct export data and mirror data for Ethiopian flowers 
Year Mirror Data (in 000 
USD) 
Direct Export data 
(in 000 USD) 
Discrepancy (Mirror 
–Direct Data in 000 
USD) 
The discrepancy 
in percentage 
2001 892 282 610 216.31 % 
2002 1,913 19 1,894 9968.42 % 
2003 4,941 305 4,636 1520.00 % 
2004 6,676 443 6,233 1407.00 % 
2005 13,988 9,712 4,276 44.03 % 
2006 31,155 24,950 6,205 24.87 % 
2007 66,148 65,930 218 0.33 % 
2008 112,581 104,467 8,114 7.77 % 
2009 138,346 128,677 9,669 7.51 % 
2010 165,567 139,102 26,465 19.03 % 
2011 200,643 166,843 33,800 20.26 % 
2012 206,647 162,034 44,613 27.53 % 
2013 229,772 165,136 64,636 39.14 % 
Source - The International Trade Centre (ITC, 2014) and Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority (ERCA, 2014) 
Figure 3 - Difference between mirror data and direct export data for Ethiopian flowers (ITC, 2014; ERCA, 2014) 
 
Source - The International Trade Centre (ITC, 2014) and Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority (ERCA, 2014) 
Three possible reasons can be attributed to this discrepancy. The first is the difference in data 
source, i.e. the exporting and importing countries report. In explaining such discrepancies, the 
International Trade Center (2014) underlines that export statistics of exporting countries 
rarely line up exactly with the import statistics of partner countries. It lists a number of 
reasons such as the difference in quantity measurement, time lag, misallocation etc. Even 
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though such factors can have a role in creating such inconsistency, the materiality of the 
discrepancy between the export statistics reported by Ethiopia and its importing partner 
countries casts doubt on whether the registered gap in relation to the Ethiopian flower export 
is indeed caused by such factors. The other two possible reasons are incentives to under-report 
export by Ethiopian exporters and illusive trade practices by importers of the Ethiopian flower 
products in the destination countries. In the following paragraphs, explanation of the two 
possible reasons in relation to the perceived discrepancy in the export statistics of Ethiopian 
flower is provided.  
As far as the incentive to underreport export is concerned, exporters normally have the 
incentive to underreport their export to the exporting country’s tax authorities to reduce/avoid 
their export-related tax burden. The afore-mentioned discrepancy between the flower export 
value from the Ethiopian authorities and the importing countries authorities could be partly 
due to such practices by exporters basing in Ethiopia. For instance, Taylor (2011) attributes 
such discrepancies to the possible elusive practices by the Ethiopian exporters who, according 
to him, have the incentive to underreport export figures in an effort to reduce their tax burden 
in Ethiopia. Thus, he concludes that in reality the Ethiopian flower export figures are higher 
than is reported by the Ethiopian government offices. However, the claim does not seem to 
explain the picture behind such manipulation especially when taken in the context of the 
appealing tax inducements made by the Ethiopian government (see section 8.1.5 for detail). 
The Ethiopian government offers flower growers and exporters a number of export promoting 
inducements including tax exemption for seven years. This rules out the economic incentive 
of understating export by the Ethiopian flower exporters. It is, therefore, unreasonable to 
conclude that the afore-discussed discrepancy is mainly due to the opportunistic behavior of 
the Ethiopian exporters.  
This takes us to the third possible cause, the opportunistic behavior by importers. Importers 
have the incentive to manipulate their importing activity when a certain country’s products get 
preferential treatment over other countries products by the importing country authorities. In 
this regard, Ethiopian flowers are given preferential treatment to the European market under 
the ACP-EU Convention. Under the Cotonou Agreement between the African, Carebean and 
Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the EU, agricultural products from the ACP countries are 
exempted from import duty in the EU ( (ACP-EU, 2000).  Even within the context of the 
Cotonou Agreement, Ethiopia get a more preferred treatment and market access than other 
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flower producing African and developing country producers under the EU’s ‘Everything But 
Arms’ (EBA) initiative which grant tariff-free access for Least Developing Countries’ 
products to European markets (UNCTAD, 2009). In the same way, Norway also has the so 
called generalized system of preferences under which import of goods from developing 
countries can benefit from preferential customs duty rates. Thus, commodities like flower 
originating from Ethiopia enjoy the preferential treatment (Norwegian Embassy in Ethiopia, 
2014). Likewise, in the USA, Ethiopian products enjoy preferential treatment under the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (ITA, 2014). Unless backed by robust system 
that controls for evasive business manipulations, such schemes can encourage opportunistic 
behavior by established flower importers and industry players to take advantage of the 
preferential treatment in the name of developing countries. 
In an effort to see if there is any pattern that could be potentially attributed to such practices, I 
examined both the mirror and direct data for several countries offering preferential treatment 
to the Ethiopian flowers and I found out interesting pattern. To show the pattern, I selected the 
main export destination countries for Ethiopian flowers within the EU i.e. the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Germany along with Norway. I focused on these selected countries not only 
because they are the main destination markets for Ethiopian flowers but mainly because these 
are the countries for which I have consistently found higher discrepancy over the years. Table 
3 presents the summarized data reported by the mirror and direct export sources for the 
selected flower export destination countries for the years 2013, 2012 and 2011.  
Table 3 : Export value of Ethiopian flowers (in million USD) as reported by the mirror and direct data sources (ITC, 2014; 
ERCA, 2014) 
2013 2012 2011 
Country direct 
data 
mirror 
data 
Difference direct 
data 
mirror 
data 
Difference direct 
data 
mirror 
data 
Difference 
Netherlands 145.97 62.18 83.78 142.41 44.61 97.81 150.08 40.43 109.65 
Belgium 0.19 140.38 -140.18 0.18 130.22 -130.04 0.33 129.80 -129.47 
Germany 1.87 5.69 -3.82 2.52 3.82 -1.30 3.15 3.99 -0.84 
Norway 4.31 12.75 -8.43 3.86 11.27 -7.41 3.23 9.27 -6.05 
Total  152.34 220.99 -68.65 148.97 189.91 -40.94 156.78 183.49 -26.71 
Source - The International Trade Centre (ITC, 2014) and Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority (ERCA, 2014) 
As can be seen from Table 3, the total discrepancy for these four countries accounts for the 
lion share of the overall discrepancy showed in Table 2. It should be noted that the same trend 
has been uncovered in the years before 2011. Therefore, it can be concluded that these 
countries are the prime sources for the existing discrepancy. Further examination of the 
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statistics in Table 3 revels that the direct export data for the Netherlands exceeds the mirror 
data for all the years considered while the reverse is true for the other countries. At surface 
glance, this may not be surprising as the Netherlands is a flower trading hub through which 
most of Ethiopian flower products are redistributed to the European market and beyond. 
Hence, it can be argued that the discrepancy is the result of re-exporting by the Netherlands. 
Even then, it casts doubt on whether re-exporting, an activity that does not include any value 
adding, can account for this much gap in the value of the export. One way to make a rough 
check on this is to estimate the margin between the average price for the Ethiopian flowers at 
the Dutch auction, which can be a good estimator for the re-exporting price, and the cost for 
Ethiopian exporters/ Dutch importers of Ethiopian flowers. Global Development Solution 
(2011) estimated the margin for Ethiopian flowers at the Dutch auction in 2010 to be around 
8%. This implies that the potential total discrepancy that should be attributed to re-exporting 
should be more or less around 8% of the total export amount for the year 2010 (165,567$ x 
8% = 13,245,360$). However, the reported discrepancy for the year 2010 as can be seen from 
Table 2 is more than 26 million USD, which is far higher than the amount derived by the 
computation based on the suggested margin. This implies that the re-exporting does not fully 
explain the existing discrepancy. The question becomes more serious when one considers the 
fact that the re-exporting by the Netherlands is acknowledged as if it was originally exported 
by Ethiopia in the importing countries such as Belgium, Germany and Norway. The presence 
of such huge discrepancy in the Ethiopian flower export statistics casts serious question. 
Therefore, it is imperative to make further investigation to identify the reason. This, however, 
is beyond this study’s purpose and scope.  
6.2 Production Network and Geographical Distribution in the Ethiopian Flower 
Industry 
The structure and organisation of the cut flower industry differs across countries. Patterns of 
ownership, factor intensity, firm and farm size, and degrees of specialisation are heavily 
dependent on infrastructure, service availability, resource endowments, relative prices, the 
institutional framework for business and the nature of markets being served. In spite of these 
variations from country to country, the broad components of the industry and the links in the 
input, production and distribution chains are more or less similar throughout the world (van 
Liemt, 1999). As is the case in other flower growing areas, the Ethiopian flower value chain 
includes a range of local and international input suppliers, packaging manufacturers, 
40 
 
distributors, service suppliers and marketing agents. Global Development Solutions (2011) 
provides detailed description of the Ethiopian flower supply chain from the raw material 
sourcing stages to the export market as shown in Figure 4 - Cut flower value chain for the 
Ethiopian flower industry 
.  
In the very upstream activities, flower growers need to source necessary inputs. As can be 
seen from Figure 4 - Cut flower value chain for the Ethiopian flower industry 
, Ethiopian flower growers depend mostly on imports in sourcing their inputs. They source 
some inputs from local traders who are located mainly in or around the capital Addis Ababa. 
However, it does not mean that all the inputs sourced from local traders are produced within 
Ethiopia (GDS, 2011). The next stage, farming, includes activities such as preparing farm 
lands, selecting the appropriate variety, planting, irrigation and applying the necessary inputs 
to grow flowers at required quality. According to the Global Development Solutions (2011), 
Ethiopian flower growers have 8-12 harvest cycles per year with each cycle taking between 
30-45 days. Once flowers are grown, they are cut to the required length, bunched, packed and 
put in refrigerated storage facilities on farm sites. All the activities in farm sites are reported 
to account for around 35% of the total cost in the value chain (GDS, 2011).  
 
Adapted from Global Development Solutions (2011) 
Breeders 
Flower production 
Cooled land transportation 
Airport 
Air flight via cargo plane 
cooled land transportation 
Sales agent/ Traders Importers 
Export Market Netherlands 
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Export Market - Other 
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Local inputs Imported inputs 
41 
 
Figure 4 - Cut flower value chain for the Ethiopian flower industry 
The flowers are then transported using refrigerated trucks to Addis Ababa where they will be 
transferred to refrigerated storage facilities at the airport until they are loaded to an aircraft. 
The land transportation to Addis Ababa accounts for 2% of the total cost in the value chain 
(GDS, 2011). Before the flowers are loaded to cargo planes, they are inspected by the 
Ethiopian Customs Authority (ECA) and the Ministry of Agriculture. The principal carrier, 
the Ethiopian Airlines, followed by KLM, Lufthansa and Etihad Airlines, plays key role in 
transporting the flowers. The air-transportation stage takes from three to four days and takes 
up around 43% of the total cost (GDS, 2011). According to the Global Development 
Solutions (2011) report, Ethiopian growers heavily depend on agents to access the auction 
system in Europe. Nearly 70% of Ethiopian flowers go through the Dutch auction system. 
Since Ethiopian Airline is the main carrier, most of the flowers are shipped to Belgium where 
the airliner lands. This compels Ethiopian exporters to buy logistic services to transport their 
flowers to the main destination country, the Netherlands (Melese & Helsing, 2010). Once the 
flowers reach the Dutch auction houses, agents unpack and refresh them so that they can be 
presented to the market at the auction houses. Flowers are then bought by 
wholesalers/exporters and shipped to warehouses in the destination countries. Florists would 
buy them from wholesalers and sell them on to consumers (Taylor, 2011; GDS, 2011). In 
terms of cost, the value chain analysis by the Global Development Solutions (2011) indicates 
that the cost of marketing Ethiopian flowers through the Dutch auction constitutes 22% of the 
total cost.  
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7 FDI in the Ethiopian flower industry 
Even though the Ethiopian government in all regimes realized the importance of FDI for the 
country’s economic development, misguided policies made the country unable to attract 
enough FDI to enhance capital accumulation and technology transfer (Geda, 2007; 
Weissleder, 2009).  Following the 1991 regime change and the subsequent market-oriented 
structural reforms, the FDI trend started to change slowly. Until recently, FDI inflow was 
insignificant when compared to the level of flow to other comparable African countries 
(Weissleder, 2009). As can be seen from Figure 5, the inward FDI flow started to build 
momentum slowly in the first half of 2000s. According to UNCTAD(a) (2014), during this 
time the yearly FDI flow to the Ethiopian economy increased continuously from USD 135 
million in 2000 to USD 545 million in 2004. It then remained constant more or less around 
USD 344 million for years between 2005 and 2007. Since then, it showed upward and 
downward trend alternatively until it peaked at USD 953 million in 2013. With a 240% 
increase from the amount in 2012, Ethiopia emerged as the third largest recipient of FDI in 
Africa in 2013. As a result, the FDI stock held within the economy reached 6.1 billion USD in 
2013, up from 5.1 billion USD in 2012. In spite of the yearly increase, the share of FDI in 
gross fixed capital formation has declined from 8.7% in 2005 to 5.7% in 2013 (UNCTAD(a), 
2014). 
Figure 5 - Yearly FDI inflow to the Ethiopian economy 
 
Source – UNCTAD (a) (2014)  
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Source - Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority (ERCA, 2014) 
Figure 6 - Number of FDI Projects in the Ethiopian flower industry (EIA, 2014) industry (EIA, 2014) 
With respect to the inflow of FDI to the Ethiopian flower industry, the first foreign company 
to be given licence in 1997 is Golden Rose Agro Farm PLC. Since then, the number of FDI 
projects in the flower industry started to build rapidly. As can be seen from Figure 6, the total 
number of FDI projects in the flower industry grew remarkably from 1 in 1997 to 144 in 
2014. The annual increase in the number of projects was high until 2004 in which year the 
annual increase peaked at 24. After 2004, the number of new projects per year showed a 
general declining trend over the years even though it increased between 2006 and 2011.  
 
 
Source - Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority (ERCA, 2014) 
 
Figure 7 -  FDI inflow and stock in the Ethiopian flower industry 
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Year Yearly FDI 
inflow to 
the flower 
sector in 
millions 
USD 
Accumulated 
FDI stock in 
the flower 
industry in 
millions USD 
Yearly FDI 
inflow to 
the 
economy 
in millions 
USD 
Accumulated 
FDI stock 
within the 
economy in 
millions USD 
yearly FDI 
inflow to flower 
industry as % of 
total FDI inflow 
to the economy 
FDI stock in 
flower industry 
as % of total 
FDI stock in 
the economy 
1997 10 10 - - - - 
2001 40 50 - - - - 
2003 57 107 - - - - 
2004 104 211 545 - 19.06 % - 
2005 36 246 344 - 10.32 % - 
2006 106 352 344 - 30.84 % - 
2007 23 374 344 - 6.81 % - 
2008 241 612 - - - - 
2009 30 646 - - - - 
2010 216 863 288 4206 75.07 % 20.51 % 
2011 1 864 627 4833 0.19 % 17.87 % 
2012 5 869 279 5111 1.77 % 17.00 % 
2013 19 888 953 6064 1.97 % 14.64 % 
2014 18 905 - - - - 
Source - Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority (ERCA, 2014) and UNCTAD (a) (2014) 
Note – Figures for some years are missing 
 
Table 4 : FDI inflow and stock in the Ethiopian flower industry 
In terms of projects’ size, as can be seen from Figure 7  and Table 4, the annual FDI inflow 
grew continuously except for few years until 2010. As a result, the total FDI stock in the 
sector has been growing continuously. Eventually by the year 2014, FDI stock in the flower 
industry reached more than 900 million USD. When compared to the FDI inflow to the 
overall economy, the relative share of FDI inflow in the flower industry maintained a yearly 
average share of 20% of the overall inflow to the economy from 2004 and 2006. Since then, 
its significance fell tremendously except the year 2010 for which the annual FDI inflow in the 
flower industry accounted for 75% of the inflow to the overall economy. In line with the 
declining trend of the yearly inflow, the relative share of the flower industry’s FDI within the 
general economy’s FDI stock showed declining trend in the last four years.. The interviewed 
experts at the Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency and the Ethiopian Horticulture 
Producers and Exporters Association acknowledge the relative decline in the yearly FDI 
inflow. The experts underlined the role the government should play in rekindling the FDI 
inflow to the sector.  
In spite of the existing inducements by the government, according to official reports, the 
yearly FDI flow to the flower industry declined for the past few years. This shows the 
need to do more. Therefore, the government need to review its policies and programmes 
to revitalize its endeavour to attract FDI. (Interviewee, EHDA) 
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Despite the declining trend in the yearly inflow, by 2014 the FDI stock within the Ethiopian 
flower industry sums up to 80% of the total investment in the industry as a whole. Ethiopian 
investors account for only 20% of the investment. In terms of firm number, out of the 120 
firms in the industry 73 are FDI driven while 11 and 36 are joint ventures and local companies 
respectively (EIA, 2014). This shows how significant FDI is in the flower industry unlike the 
other export oriented industries such as coffee wherein local investors and growers play 
significant role (Wennink, Mugoya, Kimenye, & Posthumus, 2014). Indeed, before the turn of 
the century, the infant flower industry in Ethiopia was also dominated by local players.  All 
but one of the summer-flower growing and exporting firms were domestic producers. After 
the turn of the century, the picture changes as many foreign investors, without whom the 
phenomenal growth of the floriculture export industry since 2002 would not have occurred, 
come into play. It is therefore important to assess the implication of FDI dominance in the 
industry and whether the experience can be transferred to other export oriented industries as 
well.  
 
Source - Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority (ERCA, 2014) 
 
Figure 8 - Summary of Licensed Investment Projects (FDI) by origin of investment since 1997 - 2014 (EIA, 2014) 
Another way to look into the flow of FDI is in terms of its origin. The flow of FDI between 
countries is influenced by factors such as historical relationship between countries such as 
colonial legacy, geographical proximity, country trade agreement with other countries, 
regional trade or investment agreement etc. According to the data from the Ethiopian 
Investment Agency (2014), the FDI in the Ethiopian Flower industry originates from around 
34 countries.  At individual country level, as can be seen from  
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, India is the principal source of FDI. It accounts for 17% of the total FDI in the sector. It is 
followed by the Netherlands which has 16% share. The Netherlands is closely followed by 
China and Malaysia each of which accounts for 14%. These four countries are the source of 
more than 60% of the total FDI flow. In terms of region level, with more than 45% share Asia 
is the most important source followed by EU which accounts for slightly over one fourth of 
the total amount of the FDI (EIA, 2014).  
Geographical proximity and existing economic interaction can be a factor for the flow from 
the Asian countries whereas in the case of European investors, in addition to geographical 
proximity and existing economic interaction, development oriented bilateral and multilateral 
programmes to promote FDI in developing countries might have played a role. Melese and 
Helmsing (2010) argues that in addition to the attractiveness of Ethiopia in pulling FDI and 
the rising flower production costs in Europe, which led to relocation of production to 
developing countries, development cooperation programs such as the Dutch programme for 
cooperation in emerging markets (PSOM) played significant role. By providing up to 60% 
funds for FDI projects in designated developing countries, the program has been instrumental 
in stimulating Dutch and other European growers to invest in Ethiopia (Melese & Helmsing, 
2010). Likewise, the possibility of producing in a country exempted from duty in the 
European market is also another probable cause in pushing FDI to Ethiopia. Taylor (2011) 
noted that the booming in Ethiopian flower was supported by a shift of growers’ focus from 
other established exporting countries to Ethiopia not only due to the attractive investment 
climate but also the possibility of tapping opportunities under specific programs such as 
Cotonou Agreement.  
All in all, even though Asia is the most important source of the FDI in the flower industry, 
Europe is also instrumental in originating FDI to the Ethiopian flower industry. This 
combined with the role Europe plays as focal market destination and input supplier makes the 
European flower industry the dominant force in shaping the Ethiopian flower industry. 
Therefore, the competitiveness of the Ethiopian flower industry should be assessed in light of 
the development and trends in its European counterpart as suggested by the double diamond 
framework. In line with this, in section 847 the competitiveness of the Ethiopian flower 
industry is examined in detail not only based on local factors within the Ethiopian economy 
but also by taking into account the driving forces emanating from the European flower 
industry.   
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8 Competitiveness of the Ethiopian Flower Industry 
The analysis done so far describes the Ethiopian flower industry in terms of export growth, 
market destination, value chain, and FDI inflow.  In the process of doing so, it uncovers how 
the Ethiopian flower industry is related to its European counterpart not only as market 
destination, but also as a source of crucial inputs to the industry including capital and 
knowhow. The analysis in this section examines the competitiveness of the Ethiopian flower 
industry by assessing the conditions in the Ethiopian local context in light with the general 
trend in the European flower industry.  
8.1.1 Demand Condition 
As Porter’s (1990) diamond framework stipulates, the presence of strong domestic market is 
one of the prime sources of competitiveness for local industries. The domestic market for 
flower in Ethiopia is not in a position to play the role prescribed in the diamond framework. It 
is at its infancy stage. As the interviewed farm managers explained, in Ethiopia flowers are 
predominantly used on special occasions by insignificant portion of the urban population. All 
interviewed managers acknowledge the growing culture of buying flowers during occasions 
such as wedding and the popularized western fraternity days such as Valentine’s Days. 
However, all interviewed managers agreed that the size of the domestic demand is very 
limited, seasonal and not diverse and hence, the domestic demand is not capable enough to 
influence the competitiveness of flower producers at its current stage. This has also been 
unanimously reflected in the response of sampled farm managers. As can be seen in Table 5, 
sampled flower growers were asked to appraise the local demand conditions for flowers in 
Ethiopia based on a five point scale that runs from very insignificant to very significant. Most 
respondents rated it as low with the average rating being closer to the lowest grading except 
the growth of the local demand which they rated as more or less moderate. In spite of the 
improvement in the local demand, the potential of the market is constrained by the purchasing 
power of Ethiopian consumers whose average income is one of the lowest in the world. In 
addition to individual consumers, the interviewed managers have also acknowledged the 
emergence of institutional buyers such as big hotels and some governmental offices during 
public holidays and meetings. One of the managers even went on to claim that there are small 
scale growers who produce and sell basic types of flowers like roses solely to cater the local 
market in and around Addis Ababa.  
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Table 5 : Response of flower growers regarding the domestic demand for flowers in Ethiopia (Source- Questionnaire 
2014) 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total No.of 
respondents 
Mean Standard 
Dev. 
How do you rate the proportion of your 
local sales to your total sales?       
22 4 - - - 26 1.15 0.37 
How would you describe the local 
demand progress?       
2 5 11 7 1 26 3.00 2.12 
How would you rate the bargaining 
power of your local demand?        
24 2 - - - 26 1.08 0.28 
How would you describe the level of 
sophistication/complexity of your local 
demand 
23 3 - - - 26 1.12 0.33 
Note – The scale runs from very insignificant (1) to very significant (5). The numbers in the first 5 
columns indicate the number of respondents under that scale. The values in the last two columns 
are average scores and standard deviation of the respondents’ rating. Average score of < 2.5 is 
interpreted as insignificant and > 3.5 as significant. A score between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as 
modest. 
It can therefore be said that the Ethiopian flower market is at a stage of what Labaste (2005) 
call ‘immature’. It is not sufficiently sophisticated to help Ethiopian flower growers achieve 
competitive advantages. However, given the size of the population and the recent economic 
improvement and rapid urbanization in Ethiopia, the market can be thought to have the 
potential to improve significantly in the years ahead. Two of the interviewed farm managers 
agree with this hypothesis, reservedly though.  
There has been significant improvement in the local demand though it is still 
insignificant at its current level. If the trend goes on like this, the local demand can 
become important but even then, our export market in the developed countries will 
always be the decisive one. (Interview, Farm Manager 2) 
Given the trend we are witnessing in the local market, it can be said that it is getting 
well and it is advantageous if it goes on like this. But what we have right now is not 
sufficient enough to take up the excess production we at times have. If the local demand 
becomes big enough to take up our excess production during peak times, that is helpful. 
(Interviewee, Farm Manager 3)  
Indeed, at its current level the local demand is too small and negligible, as majority of the 
Ethiopian population is living at subsistent level with undeveloped flower consumption 
culture. Therefore, the local demand can be said to be not capable enough to enhance the 
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competitiveness of the industry in a way postulated by Porter (1990). It may not be able to do 
so in the foreseeable future either. However, it can help flower producers to be competitive in 
a peripheral but important way especially when the growers encounter demand shocks in their 
export markets. For instance, Taylor (2011) revealed that Ethiopian flower producers were 
affected during the recent global financial crisis as they were forced to under export. The 
impact of the global financial crisis has been evidenced in this study as well. As can be seen 
from section 6.1, the yearly growth of flower export from Ethiopia was affected during the 
crisis years even though the absolute size of the export was increasing. In such circumstances, 
the local market provides growers with alternative. However, as the interviewed managers 
pointed out, the local demand was not big enough to take up the excess stock they had during 
the crisis years. This would mean that growers were dumping some of their production. If the 
local demand was significant enough, flower growers would not have been affected to the 
extent they were by the crisis. Although the lack of a strong local demand is as a barrier to 
competitiveness according to Porter’s (1990) diamond framework, the notion that the 
domestic market in Ethiopia for flowers will have no role in promoting flower producers’ 
competitiveness is pessimistic. The potential of the market presents have significant 
contribution to the competitiveness of domestic producers. However, the mechanism through 
which the local demand contributes to the competitiveness of the sector is in a different way 
than stipulated by Porter’s (1990) diamond framework. With the rising culture of buying 
flowers and the improving economic condition in Ethiopia, the local demand can enhance the 
competitiveness of Ethiopian flower producers by absorbing their excess production. 
Even though it does not benefit from the local demand situation in terms of competitiveness in 
the conventional way, the strong interaction the Ethiopia flower industry has with the 
European flower industry as primary destination market and source of input is pivotal in 
keeping in touch with the global trend. Indeed, the Ethiopian flower industry came into 
existence in response to the increasing demand for and production cost of flowers in Europe. 
Therefore, developments in the European market are decisive for the functioning and 
competitiveness of the Ethiopian flower industry in so many ways. As the flowers are 
produced mainly for the European market, they should be qualitative enough to meet the 
expectation of European buyers. With this in mind, assessment on the implication of the 
European market’s size, composition and sophistication to the Ethiopian flower industry is 
provided below. 
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With respect to market size, Europe represents the largest flower market in the world. It 
account for about half of the global demand for flowers (Rikken, 2010). The consumption has 
been growing continuously over the past decades as has been discussed in Chapter 0. Even 
though the demand for flowers experienced a slowing growth during the recent financial 
crisis, the market is lingering at high level after the crisis. Although major markets in Western 
Europe, such as Germany, Italy, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, are stagnating owing 
to saturation; with the high and stable per capita consumption in many European countries 
there is a general feeling that the market in Western Europe would go through a period of 
modest growth (GIA, 2012). In addition, the explosive growth in East-European countries 
including Russia is expected to support a further accelerated increase in the demand for 
flowers in Europe as a whole (GIA, 2012; Rikken, 2010).  Thus, the Western European and 
the emerging Eastern European markets are expected to experience 2% to 4% and 5% to 10% 
annual growth respectively during the next decade (Rikken, 2010). This presents an 
opportunity for the Ethiopian flower producers who have performed well in the European 
market over the past few years. As can be seen from Table 6 below, Ethiopian growers 
managed to put Ethiopia into the map of major exporting countries to Europe within a short 
period of time. If they can keep up the momentum, they will be able to benefit even more 
from the expanding market in Europe. 
 
Source – The Netherlands Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI, 2013) 
Table 6 :  Leading developing countries suppliers of fresh cut flowers and foliage to the EU27 in 2012 
With respect to the composition of the demand, the share of occasional buyers is lower in 
matured Western European markets. Most of the individual consumers are those that buy for 
‘own’ use. Consumers in this segment buy flowers with the intention of brightening up their 
home and creating a pleasant environment. Thus, they are particularly interested in new and 
exclusive products. With this, flowers, once considered to be a mere special occasion 
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products, are now gaining recognition as convenient decorative items with rapid changes in 
customer attitudes. This segment of buyers is the more demanding segment in Western 
Europe market and it is becoming prominent in the emerging eastern European market as 
well. Therefore, convenience and price setting are becoming critical in the European flower 
end-users market (Rikken, 2010). In addition, nowadays European consumers have become 
more refined in their tastes. For instance, until recently, the origin of flowers was often 
unknown at retail level and no retailer would dare to guarantee a minimum vase-life. 
However, nowadays, consumers in some matured European markets are becoming more 
sensitive to vase-life and the way flowers are produced. They demand for sustainably 
produced and distributed flowers. They want to know where their products come from, how 
they are produced, whether workers are treated fairly etc (Rikken, 2010).  
The characteristics of the institutional buyers is more or less the same with the own use 
segment. Even though the share of this segment is currently estimated at 20% of the total 
demand, it is expected to rise further as the use of flower become more and more common in 
institutional settings. As is the case with own use consumers, institutional buyers are 
becoming more interested in sustainable products. With corporate social responsibility 
policies becoming more important in governments and companies, many governments and 
businesses are strictly inclining towards sustainable products. For instance, the Netherlands 
government has a plan of making all its flower purchases 100% sustainable products by 2015 
(Rikken, 2010). Such buyers’ preferences and expectations in future are expected to be 
increasingly demanding and ever more differentiated and dynamic (van Uffelen & de Groot, 
2005).  
Such buyers’ preferences and expectations of the European flower consumers have greater 
implication to Ethiopian flower producers. Ethiopian flower growers need to respond to the 
changing needs of their ultimate buyers. According to the double diamond framework, their 
active presence in the European flower market should help them keep up with the trend in 
customers’ preferences. Their presence in the European market provides Ethiopian flower 
producers with the opportunity to catch up with the market trend. The same holds for flower 
growers from other regions and countries who are supplying to the European flower market. 
Therefore, keeping up with the trend in the European market enables Ethiopian flower 
producers to have competitive parity, not competitive advantage, with flower growers from 
other regions and countries.  
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8.1.2 Factor Condition 
As thoroughly described in Chapter 4, factor conditions are the main driving forces for the 
relocation of cut flower production from traditional hubs of production in the Northern 
hemisphere such as Western Europe towards the low latitude developing countries where 
climatic conditions, easy availability of land and cheap labour costs allowed a more 
favourable and efficient year-round production. Even though the favourability of the afore-
mentioned factor conditions holds for Ethiopia too, the continued competitiveness of the 
Ethiopian flower industry depends on how sustainable are the relative advantages coming 
from the factor conditions. The country’s factor conditions are assessed under three main 
categories in the discussion to follow. 
8.1.2.1 Natural Resources 
As clarified in section 2.2, the abundance, quality, accessibility, and cost of natural resources 
set the basic conditions necessary for efficient production of agricultural products like 
flowers. Ethiopia can be thought to have an ideal ecology for floricultural development. In 
terms of the agricultural land size, out of the country’s 111.5 million hectares area coverage, 
66% is suitable for agriculture and out of this only 22 % has been used. In terms of water 
resource, the country has a substantial amount of surface and ground water resource. The 
country has twelve major river basins and has more than 20 major lakes. In spite of this 
potential, the country’s water resource is under-utilized. Geographically, Ethiopia is a 
mountainous country. Its diversified altitude, which ranges from 4500m above to 125m below 
sea level, creates a range of microclimates suitable to grow a wide range of tropical and 
subtropical crops (Mengistu, 2006). Indeed, in such heterogeneous country, the distribution of 
agricultural potential is uneven. Due to its proximity to the equator, the country has the sun 
overhead almost throughout the year and the higher elevation in the highlands makes day time 
temperature moderate while making the nights cool with low humidity. These conditions 
create suitable environment in broader part of the country, mainly around the highlands and 
the adjacent rift valley area, for growing a range of flower varieties (Taylor, 2011; Joosten, 
2007). Parts of the Ethiopian highlands within a range of 2,400–2,600 metres above sea level 
have favourable climatic condition to produce larger-headed and longer-stemmed roses which 
are the two main attributes in dictating the price for rose flowers (Taylor, 2011). In the 
regions of the Rift Valley and Upper Awash river, where the altitude is between 1,100 – 1,800 
metres above sea level, the climatic condition is suitable to grow small to medium sized rose 
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varieties (sweethearts and intermediates) and other flowers like summer flowers and cuttings 
(Joosten, 2007). According to Taylor (2011), the Ethiopian flowers are of high quality 
compared to their direct competitor, Kenyan flowers and as a result, they command a higher 
price in the European market than the Kenyan flowers do. 
The interviewed managers and experts underline the opportunity the geographical and 
climatic conditions of the country present to flower growers. The interviewed expert from the 
Horticultural Development Agency stated  
‘The climate in Ethiopia is highly versatile in a sense that it creates an agricultural 
environment where a wide range of agricultural products can be produced at some 
part of the country’ (Interviewee, HDA Expert).  
This has also been reflected by the response of sampled farm managers. They were asked to 
appraise the natural endowment of Ethiopia for growing flower  based on a five point scale 
that runs from very insignificant (1) to very significant (5).  As can be seen from Table 7, Table 
8 and Table 9 most of the farm managers rated the country’s climate, land and water resources 
favourably.  
Table 7: Availability of supply (the scale runs from very scarce to readily available) 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total No.of 
respondents 
Mean Standard Dev. 
Land     - - 2 21 3 26 4.04 0.45 
Water        - - 8 14 4 26 3.85 0.70 
Table 8 : Quality of the natural resources 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total No.of 
respondents 
Mean Standard Dev. 
Land     - - 5 17 4 26 3.96 0.60 
Water        - - 11 12 2 25 3.64 0.72 
Climate - - 7 11 8 26 4.04 0.78 
Table 9 : Relative cost associated with natural resources 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total No.of 
respondents 
Mean Standard Dev. 
Land     - - 6 12 8 26 4.08 0.74 
Water        - - 18 7 1 26 3.35 0.93 
Note –The numbers in the first 5 columns indicate the number of respondents under that scale. The 
values in the last two columns are average scores and standard deviation of the respondents’ 
rating. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as insignificant and > 3.5 as significant. A score 
between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as modest. 
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Even though the suitability of the country’s climatic conditions to flower production is 
undeniable, it is also a source of challenge to growers. Taylor (2011) underlines the threat 
emanating from the climatic condition. He states that the extended rainy seasons in the 
Ethiopian highland, which occurs at a key time for rose production, puts Ethiopia at 
disadvantage when compared to its competing neighbour Kenya, which has shorter and earlier 
rainy season. The extended rainy season in the highland areas creates humidity that creates the 
condition for the prevalence of certain flower diseases uncommon in competing countries 
(Taylor, 2011).  
All in all, the country’s natural resource endows the country with natural assets such as 
powerful sunlight, plentiful water supply, warm day and moderate night time temperatures, 
and mineral rich volcanic soil especially in the highlands and the adjacent rift valley. This 
creates suitable environment to grow high quality flowers, particularly roses. However, with 
the natural advantage comes a challenge in the form of uncommon flower disease. The 
challenge for the country is thus to cope up with this by developing long-last solution. 
8.1.2.2 Infrastructure 
As discussed in section 6.2, the peculiar product and production characteristics of flowers 
necessitate not only efficient organization and management of the value chain but also speedy 
distribution channels. This magnifies the role of infrastructure. The presence of good 
infrastructure enhances the competitiveness of the sector. It enables firms not only to connect 
with their customers and suppliers efficiently but also use production technologies effectively. 
On the other hand, infrastructural deficiency not only limits productive opportunities but also 
increases costs (Porter, 1990; World Bank, 2014). The infrastructural development in Ethiopia 
is at its infant stage as is the case with most developing countries. The country’s transport 
infrastructure is underdeveloped. The country has one of the lowest road-density with limited 
interconnecting links between regions. The proportion of paved road is extremely low and 
there is no active train network. The only positive thing out of the country’s current state of 
transportation infrastructure is the air transportation situation. Courtesy to the upgrading 
efforts of the Bole International Airport and the renaissance of Ethiopian Airlines, Addis 
Ababa is now a regional hub for air transportation to the mainland Africa from Middle-east, 
Asia and Europe (Foster & Morella, 2010). Ethiopia’s strategic geographical location has 
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played a role in this regard. Its proximity to Europe and the Middle East not only helped the 
country emerge as air transportation hub but also assured that the flowers reach these markets 
in a relatively shorter period of time at cheaper transportation cost compared to other African 
and Latin American flower producing countries. Even then, Splinter, Brusselaers, Jan; van 
Galen, Michiel (2011) stated that the airport’s infrastructure and facilities do not meet the 
international standards. According to them, the Bole International Airport’s facilities are too 
small to support the increasing flower production and export as this in combination with the 
rather poor handling at the airport are creating long waiting times for the trucks shipping the 
flowers from the production sites. In addition, the government is blamed for creating 
disproportionate bureaucracy that favours the national carrier, Ethiopian Airlines, whose 
monopolistic services are criticized for being unreliable and inconvenient. Some of the 
interviewed managers have also mentioned the logistics problem at the airport and custom 
offices not only in relation to exported flowers but also in relation to incoming inputs. 
According to them, due to the bottlenecking bureaucracy at the custom offices, inputs 
logistics takes too much time to reach the desired destination.  
With respect to ICT, the sector suffers from a poor institutional and regulatory framework. 
The slow, expensive, and unreliable phone and internet services provided by the state 
monopoly Ethio-Telecom is rated as one of the lowest even by sub-Saharan Africa standard. 
(Adam, 2010; ITU, 2014). The same holds with respect to Electricity. The poor and unreliable 
service delivered by the state monopoly, Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO), 
created a bottlenecking situation for the emerging economy (Foster & Morella, 2010). The 
interviewed managers underlined the challenges they encountered due to the erratic electricity 
service. One sample response reads as follows – 
Once we finish the post-harvesting, we depend on cooled processing and packing 
warehouses to preserve the freshness of the flowers. Due to these, dependable power 
supply is pivotal to us. However, the recurrent power outage makes it difficult for us to 
depend on the service we get from the EEPCO and hence, we are left with no chance 
but to arrange our own standby generators at high costs. This increased our operating 
cost.  (Interviewee 1, Farm Manager) 
From the above discussion, it can be said that the current infrastructural situation in Ethiopia 
is not sufficiently supporting the flower industry’s growth and global competitiveness. Such 
infrastructural situation is the case not only to Ethiopia but to other flower growing African 
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countries as well. According to the annual competitiveness report on Africa, the current 
infrastructure deficit in African countries reduces the continents annual growth by at least 2 
percent. Infrastructural problem is identified as the prime obstacle for productivity 
improvement, private sector development, economic diversification, and spatial inclusion 
(World Bank, 2013).  
Despite the challenges, Ethiopia has made significant progress in infrastructure over the past 
two decades. It launched an ambitious project to build, upgrade and repair its trunk-roads 
network in the late 1990s and has set up a modern road-maintenance fund which is financed 
by a levy on fuel prices. As a result, the country was able to maintain, rehabilitate and 
upgrade the main trunk and regional roads significantly in the past few years (FDRE, 2012; 
Foster & Morella, 2010). In line with this, the quality of the roads to the floriculture growing 
areas has been improved significantly and hence, industry spectators rated it as good although 
additional improvements are needed (Splinter, Brusselaers, & van Galen, 2011). Parallel with 
projects aimed at improving the main roads, the government commenced the construction of a 
nationwide 23,000-kms railways system that goes to every corner of the country. With the 
projects proposed completion in five years, the country’s land transportation is expected to 
improve remarkably (ERC, 2014). With respect to air transportation, a project aimed at 
establishing a new international airport with much greater capacity than the Bole International 
Airport near the capital Addis Ababa has already been started in addition to upgrading the 
Bole and Dire Dawa International Airport and the opening of a dozen regional airports. This 
infrastructure improvement includes the emergence of Ethiopian Airlines as a leading African 
Airliner and the emergence of Addis Ababa as a main hub for air transpiration from and to 
Africa (FDRE, 2012; Foster & Morella, 2010). Airfreight and handling services at the Bole 
Airport and capacity by the Ethiopian Airline has also been reported to have been improved 
over the years. The capacity improvement under government subsidy resulted in lower 
transportation cost with improved service (Capital Ethiopia, 2012). 
With respect to ICT and telecommunication infrastructure, substantial progress has been made 
over the last decade as a result of a massive investment by the government. The increase in 
access network, completion of core network, introduction of fixed and mobile broadband 
access, rolling out of fibre backbone and establishment of links to about 10,000 rural villages 
mark the infrastructure successes in the area (Adam, 2010). In the same way, remarkable 
improvement has been made on electricity and power supply in the past two decades. The 
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country’s total hydropower generation capacity increased from 340 MW in 1991 to more than 
2000MW in 2010. With the planned completion of the underway mega hydropower projects 
in 2015, the hydropower generation capacity is expected to boost remarkably to more than 
10000 MW. Similarly, the length of power transmission lines across the country almost 
doubled in 2010 from its 8,380 km in 2005. In the same way, the length of power distribution 
lines improved remarkably from 25,000 km in 2005 to 126,038 km in 2010 and with the 
completion of the ongoing projects, it is expected to increase to 258,038 kms in few years 
time. With a number of mega hydropower projects including the Renaissance Dam on Abay 
River (Blue Nile) and with additional others being planned, the electricity coverage and 
reliability in Ethiopia is expected improve remarkably. (EEPCo, 2013; Lighting Africa, 2011). 
All these improvements are expected to help the country’s industries attain their potential. 
In general, cognizant of the infrastructural role within the economy, the Ethiopian government 
plans to scale up the ambitious infrastructure expansion program further in the years ahead. It 
vows to continue investing heavily in transportation, ICT & telecommunications, power 
generation & transmission, as well as in other infrastructural areas (MFED, 2010). Even 
though the country’s infrastructure is currently not sufficiently promoting the competitiveness 
of domestic industries, given these progresses made so far and the potential improvements 
ahead, it can be said that the infrastructure in Ethiopia will play a key role in continuing and 
accelerating the progress made in recent years in many industries including the flower 
industry. 
8.1.2.3 Human Resource and Social Makeup 
Porter (1990) stated that the availability and quality of the required manpower for a given 
industry is one of the pivotal resource bases that ensure sustainable competitive advantage. 
The labour force required for flower production can be divided into three categories - 
managerial; technical; and manual. Each of these categories requires different processes of 
sourcing, transforming, creating and sustaining strategies. Besides, the labour force 
requirement varies significantly depending on where flowers are grown. As documented in 
Chapter 4, traditionally the primary production centre for commercial floriculture was placed 
in Europe and North America where the major markets are located. However, since the 
1980’s significant production was relocated to tropical countries. Even then, Europe is still 
significant producer for highly perishable premium verities. The conditions in the two 
production areas set two distinct production approaches. In Europe, producers tend to 
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mechanize their production process due to the high labour cost and energy requirement. This 
necessitates higher initial capital input. Conversely, in developing countries the warm climatic 
condition and the cheap labour induce the use of intensive manual labour with comparatively 
insignificant demand for energy. This set the condition for different requirement for labour in 
the two production areas (Taylor, 2011). Due to the emphasis on quality, the manual forces 
need not only a set of basic agricultural skills  but also training as to how to perform precise 
tasks such as pruning, spraying, fertilising, harvesting, irrigation and packaging. This requires 
a readily available and cheap labour force with the ability and willingness to learn.  
Table 10 - Characteristics of labor force in Ethiopian flower firms in terms of cost, education, experience and availability 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total No.of 
respondents 
Mean Standard Dev. 
Wages and salaries     22 4 0 0 0 26 1.15 0.37 
Education /Training 11 9 6 0 0 26 1.81 1.04 
Experience 13 6 5 2 0 26 1.85 1.23 
Availability 0 1 3 4 19 26 4.7 0.81 
 
Note –The numbers in the first 5 columns indicate the number of respondents under that scale. The 
values in the last two columns are average scores and standard deviation of the respondents’ 
rating. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as low and > 3.5 as high. A score between 2.5 and 
3.5 is interpreted as modest.  
The afore-mentioned condition gives a comparative advantage to Ethiopia whose total 
population sums up between 85 and 90 million out of which 85% is rural based. The country 
has an abundant, inexpensive, disciplined and easily trainable workforce (Taylor, 2011; 
World Bank, 2014). Flower producers have no challenge in finding labourers willing to work 
for low wages. When compared to other flower producing tropical countries that have similar 
ecological and economic conditions such as Kenya, the cost of labour is by far cheaper in 
Ethiopia. This is evidenced by the response of the questionnaire as shown in Table 10. As can 
be seen from the table, sampled flower growers were asked to appraise the characteristics of 
their labour force in terms of   cost, education, experience and availability based on a five 
point scale that runs from very low (1) to very high (5). They unanimously appraised their 
labour force characteristics as relatively cheaper, and readily available with limited 
educational and experience background. The government’s minimum wage for public sector 
is Birr 320 (around 16 USD) a month. This, however, does not apply to the private sector. In 
the private sector, salaries and wages are decided by the market but it is not more than 1 USD 
a day for unskilled labour in the Ethiopian flower industry (Taylor, 2011). Though indirectly, 
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Global Development Solutions (2011) reported similar finding. It found that farming costs, 
mainly labour cost, in the Ethiopian flower industry were 25% lower per hectare than in 
Kenya with loss rates at 2% compared with 5% in Kenya. It should however be noted that the 
same report revealed that the Ethiopian flower industry is less productive than its Kenyan 
counterpart when the costs-per-stem is considered.  However, Taylor (2011) argues that the 
economies of scale that have been gained with the growth of the industry since the study by 
Global Development Solutions was conducted have most likely improved the productivity and 
hence, he down played the productivity difference. Therefore, Ethiopia can be said to have a 
better competitive position than its flower producing counterparts as far as the availability of 
low-cost manual labour is concerned.  
In addition to labourers, the management and administration of flower farms requires the 
availability of skilled and experienced managerial and technical human resources. As 
discussed in section 2.2, with respect to a country’s endowment of human capital, Porter 
(1990) made a distinction between basic unskilled labor, which is determined by a country’s 
exogenous  endowment and skilled labor that is created and upgraded through education, 
practice and training. He further distinguished between generalized factors which can be 
deployed in a wide range of industries and specialized factors which cannot. According to 
him, the availability of these expertise forms the basis for the sustainable competitive 
advantage of a country’s industry. Within this framework, the managerial and technical skills 
required by the flower industry fall under the general and specialized skills category 
respectively. It is preferable for flower growers to employ local expertise not only because 
local professionals are cheaper but also they are more sensitive to domestic requirements and 
conditions. As the income earned remains in the country and as local professionals are 
provided with the opportunity to nurture their professional skills, it is also preferable for the 
hosting country, in this case Ethiopia, and the stable future for the industry. In order for this to 
happen, the required skill level should be available in the local labour market. As far as the 
category of managing the business is concerned, general business expertises and skills such as 
in accountancy, business negotiation and people management as well as experience in the 
administrative aspects of running a business are available in sufficient supply in Ethiopia 
(2010). Besides, the expansion of higher education institutions and availability of a wide 
range of academic and professional programs both at the undergraduate and post-graduate 
program across the country’s universities would mean that sufficient graduates are entering 
the job market. This sustains the future trained manpower supply.  
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The availability of technical labour is pivotal to the competitive success of the sector. Porter 
(1990) stresses the role of specialized skills in capacitating a sector’s competitiveness. The 
technical labour in flower production refers to the management of farms that involves 
responsibilities ranging from the selection of varieties and other input materials to managing 
plantation and irrigation on the farms, applying the necessary inputs to grow at required 
quality and controlling diseases and all post-harvest activities such as cutting, bunching and 
packing of flowers. Decisions with respect to all these responsibility areas have direct impact 
on yield, damage and loss rates, and thereby, a firm’s profitability. This implies how 
important the availability of such expertise is for the sector’s success. The availability of 
agricultural experts in Ethiopia in general can be rated as good. All public universities in the 
country have programs in agriculture with some of them having well established Agricultural 
Colleges such as Juma, Hawassa, Haromaya and Mekele Universities. In addition, the 
presence of a number of agricultural training centres ensures the supply of mid-level 
agricultural experts. However, specific university level programs that address the specific 
needs of the flower industry are not widely given and the ones available such as in Jima and 
Hawassa Universities are of recent origin. Therefore, even though the supply of general 
agricultural experts may not be an issue, shortages of technical labour with specific 
educational and experience pertaining to floriculture are far more acute when compared to 
Kenya and other African flower producing countries where well established horticultural 
programs at university level have been offered for many years (Taylor, 2010). Taylor (2010) 
reported the dissatisfaction of foreign flower investors in Ethiopia with respect to the 
availability of technical and managerial expertise. The flower farm owners cited supply 
shortage and lack of commercial and practical competences specific to the flower industry as 
the most pressing challenges. Due to this reason, nearly 50% of the flower businesses in the 
country opted to employ foreign managers (Taylor, 2010). Indeed, as the sector is relatively 
young compared to other flower growing countries, the embedded knowledge base and human 
capital is limited (Splinter, Brusselaers, & van Galen, 2011; Taylor, 2010; Joosten, 2007).  
In order to solve the problem, the Ethiopian government in collaboration with its partners 
initiated projects aimed at building capacity in the sector. A good instance is the initiative at 
Jima University by the collaboration between the Ethiopia and the Netherlands governments. 
Under the initiative, the Jima University in collaboration with Wageningen University set up 
B.A. and MSc. program in floriculture. A production area with a modern greenhouse, field 
plots with installed irrigation and two small cold stores has been established to create practical 
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learning environment for students. Students are also provided with internship opportunities at 
floriculture firms to back up their academic learning with practical experiences. In addition to 
the academic undertaking, the project involves providing consultation services to producers 
and other industry players. In addition to such academic programs at the universities, a special 
training centre dedicated exclusively to floriculture has been established at Melkasa 
Agricultural Institute. The institute is designed to have not only classrooms but also well 
equipped greenhouses, field plots and packing shed with three small cold stores so that 
practical skills training at all levels can be given to floriculture workforces (Taylor, 2010). 
Other capacity building programs in collaboration with other international partners such as the 
Swedish government and USAID technical assistance programme are being undertaken 
(Joosten, 2007). Such endeavours are expected to improve the situation.  
Table 11 - Comparative analysis of corruption, security and crime costs in selected flower growing African countries 
Country Security cost 
(% of sales) 
Losses due to theft, 
robbery, vandalism, 
and arson against 
firms (% of sales) 
Bribe  
(% of firms 
expected to give 
bribe in 
meetings with 
tax inspector) 
(% of firms 
expected to give 
bribe to secure 
government 
contract) 
(% of firms 
expected to give 
bribe to get 
operating 
license) 
Ethiopia*  0.7 0.2 4 3 12 
Kenya 3.7 1.5 17 28 15 
Uganda 4.2 0.8 14 6 18 
Tanzania 2.9 1 15 65 18 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
2.6 1.7 16 26 20 
Source – World Bank (2014) 
* The data for Ethiopia are for the year 2011 whereas the data for the other countries are for the year 
2013. Although the time lag raises question in relating the data, as the time lag is relatively 
insignificant, its impact is assumed to be marginal. 
 In terms of societal makeup and values, Ethiopia offers a peaceful civic life and less 
corrupted society when compared to other flower growing countries. As can be seen from 
Table 11, corruption, security and crime costs are lower in Ethiopia than any of the other 
competing flower growing countries in East Africa (World Bank, 2014). Similar fact has been 
evidenced in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2013/2014. Out of 
the most pressing problematic factors in conducting business in a country, corruption and 
crime & theft received 12.3% and 0.0% in Ethiopia respectively. In the other countries, a 
relatively higher percentage has been reported, i.e. Kenya – 21% for corruption and 6.9 for 
crime and theft, Tanzania – corruption 16.9% and crime and theft 2.8 and in Uganda – 
corruption 23% and crime & theft 2.2 (World Economic Forum, 2014).  Taylor (2011) 
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underlined that there is a difference between the corruption type evidenced in Ethiopia and 
other flower growing African countries. According to him, the corruption in the other 
countries is more of culturally ingrained systematic corruption whereas in Ethiopia, it is a 
matter of favouring of past and present government contacts in certain commercial areas, 
along the ethnic and party lines. Such corruption is unlikely to affect foreign investors.  
Given all these, it can be said that Ethiopia has relatively good factor conditions compared to 
other flower producing countries in Africa. The country has advantage with respect to quality 
produce, cost of freight, cost of production and proximity to the major European market. 
Although there is shortage of skilled manpower, the country has cheap and plentiful labour 
supply than many flower growing African countries. However, the country’s flower industry 
is entangled by lack of skills, professional education and experience. This can be a challenge 
for the competitive positioning of the industry globally. The efforts being made to improve 
the situation are expected to help the sector cope up with the challenge and thereby, expand 
more. The country also has a much better civil life than its competing counterparts. These 
factors combined with the suitable natural conditions and improving infrastructures makes the 
country amongst one of the suitable and preferred countries for flower production as far as 
factor conditions are concerned. 
8.1.3 Relating and Supporting Industries 
The relative competitiveness of the Ethiopian flower industry depends not only on its linkage 
with the main destination market, Europe, but also the robustness of its supply chain to cope 
up with the increasingly intense international competition. The structure of the Ethiopian 
flower production value chain is described in section 6.2. In this section, the relating and 
supporting industries within the Ethiopian flower supply chain are analyzed in terms of their 
ability in enhancing the competitiveness of the sector.  
8.1.3.1 Financial service provision 
One of those industries whose services are of paramount significance for the development of 
the flower industry is the financial sector. The presence of an efficient financial sector 
enhances the competitiveness of an economy by ensuring efficient allocation of resources to 
their most productive uses (World Economic Forum, 2014). The financial sector in Ethiopia is 
not liberalised. It is highly dictated by the government and hence, it has a non-competitive 
market structure with strong capital control in place. As foreign financial institutions are 
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barred by law, the financial sector is exclusively served by local banks with the government 
having greater role in controlling the lending process including interest rates. All foreign 
exchange transactions such as foreign exchange payments and remittances fall under the 
monopolistic jurisdiction of the National Bank of Ethiopia. The non-competitive market 
structure and the undeveloped regulatory environment have resulted in a limited and weak 
financial sector (Kiyota, Peitsch, & Stern, 2007). However, the Ethiopian flower industry has 
benefitted from the availability of government loans through the state-owned Development 
Bank of Ethiopia (DBoE). The highly favourable loan terms by the DBoE offer local and 
foreign investors in the flower industry a debt-equity ratio of 70:30 for new projects and a 
debt-equity ratio of 60:40 for the expansion of existing projects with no collateral requirement 
and against low interest rates. Loans are available with different repayment regimes - both 
medium and long-term bases. The attractive credit schemes encouraged a surge of foreign 
direct investment in the sector (Taylor, 2011).  
Table 12 - Financial Service Provision 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total No.of 
respondents 
Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Requirement to start business   0 0 3 16 7 26 4.15 0.61 
Availability 0 4 3 8 11 26 4.00 1.11 
Cost of capital     12 7 5 2 0 26 1.88 2.52 
Bargaining power of financiers   0 0 2 2 22 26 4.77 0.86 
 
Note – The numbers in the first 5 columns indicate the number of respondents under that scale. The 
values in the last two columns are average scores and standard deviation of the respondents’ 
rating. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as low and > 3.5 as high. A score between 2.5 and 
3.5 is interpreted as modest.  
In spite of the generous offers, the interviewed farm managers considered the role of DBoE in 
nurturing the domestic industry as controversial. According to them, the bottlenecking 
bureaucracy along with the inexperience of the bank with flower business affected the 
development of the industry (Interview Group, Farm Managers). This view has also been 
evidenced in the questionnaire respondents’ rating as shown in Table 12. As can be seen from 
the table, sampled flower growers were asked to appraise the financial service provision based 
on a five point scale that runs from very low (1) to very high (5). Even though the respondents 
have rated the financial supply and cost of capital positively, they have assigned higher values 
to the bargaining power of the financial institutions and the required capital to start the flower 
business in the country.  In addition, the bank’s initial policy of excluding local investors from 
the scheme hindered the participation of local investors. Even though the bank excluded local 
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investors citing the absence of the knowledge of how to set-up and grow a floricultural export 
business in Ethiopia as a reason, significant number of foreign investors who had no prior 
experience in floriculture have benefited from the bank’s loan. This not only undermined the 
development of local growers but also the possibility of buying knowledge from abroad. The 
bank has now included local investors under the scheme (Interview Group, EHPEA). 
In a related theme, the highly favourable loan terms and the bank’s lack of experience are 
reported to have encouraged opportunistic behaviour by some investors. Some investors 
considered it as an opportunity to make easy money quickly while others tried to extract 
money from the industry by submitting overstated business proposals (Taylor, 2011). In 
addition to offering generous loans, the bank played an equally important role during the 
recent global financial crisis. It helped the sector cope up with exogenous shocks of price 
crash that affected the industry during the financial crisis. When growers encountered 
difficulty to meet their loan repayments during the crisis years, the bank rescheduled 
repayments over a long term basis (Taylor, 2011). Such endeavours from the bank are 
indicative of the bank’s constructive role towards the sector. Therefore, the financial service 
being offered to the sector by the local banks, mainly the DBoE, can be considered as good in 
facilitating the competitiveness of the Ethiopian flower industry although the monopolistic 
nature of the service casts question.  
8.1.3.2 Input suppliers 
The flower industry uses a range of inputs. The primary inputs used in flower production are 
chemicals, packing, fertilisers, greenhouse materials, irrigation systems, building materials, 
and cool chain facilities. Whenever available the flower producers use domestically produced 
inputs. A good example in this regard is packaging services. Even though the local industry 
has had difficulty in meeting the quality requirements of the industry initially, the local 
packaging industry upgraded its capacity remarkably as the flower industry grew. A number 
of firms imported specialized packaging machineries and hence, now they are able to produce 
standardized packaging materials. As a result, most of the flower exporting firms use 
domestically produced packaging products (Taylor, 2011; Taylor, 2010). However, the range 
of domestically produced inputs is not only limited but also the service providers are also not 
strong enough to serve the sector. As Table 13 indicates, sampled flower growers were asked 
to appraise the role of local suppliers and inputs based on a five point scale that runs from 
very low (1) to very high (5). The respondents have rated the role of seedling, fertilizer and 
65 
 
chemical suppliers as insignificant.  However, they have relatively positive view regarding the 
role of packaging material suppliers. Due to this, interviewed managers stated that they 
mainly use imported inputs from local traders such as green-house construction, irrigation 
system materials, special pesticides and fertilizers. However, in some circumstances they 
noted that they directly import some inputs mainly due to the fact that some specialised inputs 
are unavailable in the local market. Even though the interviewed managers mentioned 
unavailability as the main factor, Global Development Solution’s (2011) study indicated cost 
as another important factor. According to the study, flower growers were able to save up to 
20% when they import by themselves. To the relief of flower growers, a number of 
international and local specialised input suppliers have started to open branches in Addis 
Ababa in response to the expansion of the sector (EHPEA, 2014). This alleviates the burden 
on growers as they can now get quality inputs at competitive prices.  
Table 13 – Role of local suppliers in growers’ view 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total No.of 
respondents 
Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Seeds/Seedlings suppliers 9 8 6 0 0 23 1.87 0.81 
Packaging materials suppliers 4 2 7 13 0 26 3.12 1.69 
Fertilizer and chemical 
suppliers 
6 15 5 0 0 26 1.96 0.67 
Note –The numbers in the first 5 columns indicate the number of respondents under that scale. The 
values in the last two columns are average scores and standard deviation of the respondents’ 
rating. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as low and > 3.5 as high. A score between 2.5 and 
3.5 is interpreted as modest.  
Genetic materials and greenhouse films are the typical inputs that need participation of 
foreign suppliers mainly from Europe. A very important and instrumental actor with respect 
to greenhouse development is Sher Ethiopia Ltd - the subsidiary of Sher Holland BV, the 
largest rose company in the world. Sher Ethiopia Ltd specializes on developing readymade 
greenhouses for growers. Sher builds not only the greenhouses, but also technologies needed 
for production such as irrigation and central spraying units. It rents out prepared greenhouses 
to growers to whom ownership is transferred after 8-9 years. By doing so, Sher Ethiopia 
improved the investment climate for new entrants, especially for small and medium 
enterprises who do not have to go through the sunk costs of developing greenhouses and 
related infrastructures. Indeed, Sher plays an important role not only in the infrastructural area 
but also in importing and distributing other inputs for flower growers, and providing logistic, 
transporting and handling services for Ethiopian growers in the Netherlands through its other 
branch called Sher/Agriflora and Flowerport  (Melese & Helsing, 2010; Taylor, 2011). 
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However, as interviewed expert from the Ethiopian Horticultural development Agency noted 
that the role of Sher in the sector is a mixed. The company’s pursuit of higher profits margins 
for its services in input, transportation and the royalties for the ready-made greenhouses have 
significantly affected other flower growers that use the company’s services. This is also 
evidenced by Taylor (2011). In an effort to ease the challenge for other growers, the 
government in collaboration with other institutional actors in the sector is planning to 
implement the ready-made turnkey greenhouse model in different areas of the country by 
using the knowledge gained during Sher’s greenhouse turnkey project (Taylor, 2011).  
Other actors that play a very important role as supplier are breeders. Breeders play a pivotal 
role as the right variety is decisive for productivity. Through licensing or by propagating 
genetics materials by themselves, breeders make their products available to growers. In 
addition to the formal mechanism, breeders, in an effort to protect their varieties, conduct 
strict informal control mechanism by exclusively avoiding selling to those growers accused of 
undermining breeders’ right. They sell their varieties only to specifically selected growers 
which comply with their property right. Therefore, it is challenging for Ethiopian growers to 
find the kind of varieties they desire (Melese & Helsing, 2010; GDS, 2011). Currently, most 
of the flower breeds are imported from other countries such as Kenya, Israel and the 
Netherlands. According to Global Development Solution (2011), royalty payments to 
breeders on average constitute 21% of the ex-farm rose production costs. This may lure the 
interest to circumvent costly royalty payments by Ethiopian growers. However, the tendency 
towards such activity brings two kinds of risk to the Ethiopian flower industry. Firstly, the 
sector’s image in the international market will be labelled as an ‘illegal’ and this may 
eventually result in exclusion from those markets especially from accessing new varieties. 
Secondly, it may have regressive impact on the development of independent and legal 
nursery/propagation service providers (GDS, 2011). The good news for Ethiopian flower 
producers is that the emergence of the Ethiopian flower industry as active player in the 
international arena is attracting the interest of several prominent breeders to establish 
propagation sites in Ethiopia (Joosten, 2007). This is expected to put the Ethiopian flower 
industry in par with its competing developing countries counterparts. Given all these 
experiences, it can be said that the input supply linkage in the Ethiopian flower industry in its 
current situation is not in a position to promote the competitiveness of the sector when 
compared to other competing flower producing countries such as Kenya although there are 
good improvements.  
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8.1.3.3 Transportation and logistics service provision 
As elaborated in section 6.2, due to the peculiar nature of the product, the flower industry is 
heavily dependent on efficient coordination of cold-chain management systems, 
transportation and logistics activities. As studies indicated, transportation and logistics costs 
constitute the highest cost share in the Ethiopian flower value chain (GDS, 2011; Taylor, 
2011). The first of the transportation and logistics activities is the inland transportation of the 
flowers from the farms to the Addis Ababa Bole International Airport. Global Development 
Solution (2011) indicates that flower producers do not have major challenge related to the 
functioning of inland transportation and handling services. The same view has been reflected 
by the interviewed farm managers. Even though there are several transportation companies 
with the capacity to handle the inland transportation, flower growers tend to prefer having full 
control of their cargo from the moment it is loaded into refrigerated trucks until it is unloaded, 
palletized and loaded onto airplanes. They use their own refrigerated trucks and conduct the 
documentation and clearing process including the loading of their products from the cold 
trucks directly into palletised loads for air shipment. They do so mainly due to the weak links 
in the supply chain. There is no centralized documentation and custom clearing process at the 
Addis Ababa Bole International Airport. Rather, most custom documentations and clearance 
activities and phytosanitary inspections are conducted on the farms. In addition, the absence 
of cold storage facilities at the airport have also facilitated for the emergence of such set up.  
This set up eventually exposes flower producers to additional risk in case the flowers loose 
quality or value due to flight delays, cancelation or any other unexpected events at any point 
in the chain (GDS, 2011; Taylor, 2011; Joosten, 2007). Thus, it can be said that the current 
decentralized set up of customs and phytosanitary inspections along with the absence of 
dedicated logistic and handling services at the airport puts Ethiopian flower producers at 
relative disadvantage when compared to their Kenyan and other flower producing 
counterparts. In order to alleviate this comparative disadvantage, Ethiopia needs to develop 
cool-chain storage facilities at the airport with established insurance provisions for losses 
and/or damage during handling, storage and moving the flowers, and establish an organised 
and centralised customs and phytosanitary services that facilitates the flow of goods and 
services at the airport. This in turn creates the incentives for the emergence of dedicated 
specialised support service providers such as freight forwarders and clearing agents (GDS, 
2011; Joosten, 2007).   
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Table 14 - Transportation and logistics service provision in the Ethiopian flower industry in growers view 
 1  2 3 4 5  Total No.of 
respondents 
Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Land Transportation service providers 5 10 11 0 0 26 2.23 0.76 
Air Transport service providers 2 5 16 3 0 26 2.77 0.94 
Logistics service providers      11 13 2 0 0 26 1.65 0.86 
The Ethiopian Horticultural Producers 
and Exporters Association      
0 0 3 19 4 26 4.04 1.92 
 
Note – Sampled flower growers were asked to appraise the transportation and logistics service 
provision in the Ethiopian flower industry based on a five point scale that runs from very low (1) 
to very high (5). The numbers in the first 5 columns indicate the number of respondents under 
that scale. The values in the last two columns are average scores and standard deviation of the 
respondents’ rating. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as low and > 3.5 as high. A score 
between 2.5 and 3.5 is interpreted as modest. As can be seen from the table, the respondents have 
rated the land transportation and logistics services as low. They have relatively modest rating 
towards the air transport service and maintained high regard to the role of the association. 
With respect to airfreight, Ethiopia can be thought to have advantage on other flower 
producing African countries in terms of geographical location and quality of national airport 
and airliner. The country has one of the leading air carriers in Africa. However, the Ethiopian 
flower industry has been entangled with capacity and cost constraint of air transportation 
since its emergence into the global business. The interviewed expert from the Ethiopian 
Horticulture Producer Exporters Association (EHPEA) indicated that airfreight capacity and 
charges are the prime challenge to expand growers’ market reach in Europe. This feeling is 
shared by the interviewed farm managers as well. Indeed, it is undeniable that operational 
intricacies surrounding the air transportation has been limiting factors in the growth of the 
flower industry as evidenced in studies by Global Development Solutions (2011) and Taylor 
(2011). More recently, however, improvement has been achieved curtsey to the commitment 
of the Ethiopian Airlines and the government. In an effort to meet the increasing demand from 
horticultural and other exporters, the Ethiopian Airlines established the 14,000m
2
 perishable 
cargo terminals with a capacity of handling 1000,000 tons of freight in a year at Bole 
International Airport in 2013 (Ethiopian, 2014). The infrastructure includes modern 
compartmentalized handling units that can provide cool-storage services. When the terminal 
is fully operated, it is expected not only to facilitate the cargo flights but also provide a way to 
improve the decentralized clearing process and the associated problems. The other huge 
airport related infrastructural improvements discussed in section 8.1.2 are also expected to 
make Addis Ababa a major cargo hub in East Africa. In addition, the airliner stepped up its 
effort to increase its cargo capacity. As a result, it offers eight chartered flights per week in 
place of one cargo per week few years before (Ethiopian, 2014). Other carriers such as 
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ETIHAD and Egypt Air make one chartered flight per week. In addition to the cargo services, 
a number of other carriers including the ones mentioned above provide limited space cargo 
service on their passenger flights although the price on passenger flights is way higher than 
the dedicated cargo flights (GDS, 2011; Taylor, 2011). The absence of competition 
contributed to the poor services and higher charges of airfreight during the early days of the 
sector. Now, the increasing number of airliners delivering cargo services is expected to make 
the cargo charges competitive. In a more recent development, flower exporters are boosted by 
Ethiopian Airline’s decision to reduce cargo size requirement. The decision came after a year-
long negotiation between the Ethiopian Horticulture Producers & Exporters Association 
(EHPEA) and the Ethiopian Airlines (EAL). The new scheme is expected to reduce the 
payment made by the exporters for the cargo service from Ethiopian (Addis Fortune, 2014).  
Given the assessment made so far, it can be said that the current transportation and logistics 
service provision in the export of Ethiopian flowers is not efficiently organized to help the 
continued development of the sector although significant improvements have been achieved 
over the past few years. When the capacity improvement projects at the Bole International 
Airport and the Ethiopian Airlines are completed, the transportation and logistics sector is 
expected to be able to put the Ethiopian flower industry at least in par with its Kenyan 
counterpart. Until then, transportation and logistics services will continue to be the prime 
challenges for Ethiopian flower exporters.  
8.1.3.4 Ethiopian Horticulture Producers & Exporters Association (EHPEA  
A very prominent industrial institution that has played significant role in the Ethiopian flower 
industry is the Ethiopian Horticulture Producers & Exporters Association (EHPEA). The 
association (EHPEA) was established in 2002 as a non-profit and non- government 
organization with the aim of promoting the development of the Ethiopian flower industry. It 
encompasses the whole horticulture sector namely vegetables, fruits and flowers. It tries to 
secure the cooperation among floriculture producers; assist promotion of horticulture exports 
to international markets; represent and promote the interest of its members; collect and 
circulate statistics and other information; and arbitrate and settle disputes between its 
members (EHPEA, 2014). Although it faced challenge during its early years due to lack of 
enough membership and lack of attention from the government, in the past decade it became 
an instrumental element within the Ethiopian flower industry.  The association has not only 
developed linkage but also lobbying with different government offices, local and international 
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institutions and businesses. Together with other actors, it managed to manoeuvre the 
government into giving the utmost support to the sector (EHPEA, 2014; Splinter, Brusselaers, 
& van Galen, 2011; Taylor, 2011). It has also conducted a number of successful negotiations 
with industry actors and others on behalf of flower producers. A good example from recent 
negotiation is the association’s success in convincing the Ethiopian airlines to bow to the 
demands of the Ethiopian flower producers (Addis Fortune, 2014). In addition, in an effort to 
create strong link among actors in the industry and promote Ethiopian flower in the 
designated markets, the association organizes a biannual trade exhibition. It also makes effort 
to promote social responsibility within the industry and thereby, improve the image of 
Ethiopian growers as sustainable produce producers. In this regard, it not only encourages and 
facilitates its members to get international certification but also recently introduced a Code of 
Practices for the flower industry. The association in collaboration with the government and 
international actors has also been involved in initiating and facilitating a number of capacity 
building initiatives aimed at improving knowledge and skills in Ethiopian floricultural farms 
such as the one at Jima University and at Melkasa Agricultural Institute. In addition, in an 
effort to alleviate transportation related problems, it established Ethio-Horti Share Company 
(EHSC) that is engaged in providing services such as freight forwarding and carriage 
arrangement (EHPEA, 2014; Splinter, Brusselaers, & van Galen, 2011; Taylor, 2011; Joosten, 
2007). The active role of the association has been reflected in the response of interviewed 
managers and questionnaire respondents as shown in Table 14. With such active role, the 
association is expected to keep on playing even more roles in enhancing the development and 
thereby promoting the competitiveness of the sector internationally.  
8.1.4 Industry Structure, Firm Strategy and Rivalry 
In terms of industry structure, flower growing firms in Ethiopia are structured around several 
clusters located in close proximity to the capital Addis Ababa. According to Global 
Development Solution (2011) study, nearly 80% of the flower farms are located within a 
radius of 50 kilometres from Addis Ababa in the directions of the five main highways 
connecting Addis Ababa to the rest of the country.  Holleta, Ziway, Sebeta, Debre Zeit and 
Addis Alem constitute the main cluster areas where there is a high concentration of flower 
farms. The high density of flower farms clustering in close proximity to the capital city 
created the agglomeration of cut flower industry service providers in Addis Ababa. For 
instance, all the forwarding and clearing service companies, the refrigerated truck service 
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providers (except for Bahr Dar), majority of input suppliers and trucking service suppliers for 
supply of inputs are exclusively located in Addis Ababa. This forced flower growers to have 
either head or liaison offices in Addis Ababa in order to access vital services. Eventually the 
growth and competitiveness of the Ethiopia’s flower industry depends mainly on how capable 
Addis Ababa is in serving as a logistical hub. The emergence of Bahirdar in the north-western 
part of the country as an independent flower hub, however, is a good example to prove that 
the flower industry can expand to the other potential areas within the country provided that 
sufficient infrastructural support is available (GDS, 2011).  
In addition to the agglomeration of economic activities of the flower industry around Addis 
Ababa, the high density of flower farms clustering around certain areas have implication for 
the way flower firms cooperate and compete with each other. Gebreeyesus & Izuka (2010) 
reported that collaboration and learning from one another had been the case in the early days 
of the industry. According to them, the close proximity of flower farms with each other 
helped new comers within the industry collaborate and learn from the then industry leader 
Golden Roses and other established farms’ experience through visits to the farms and 
discussions with management and other cooperative initiatives such as sharing of equipment 
(e.g. trucks), storage facilities (cold storage), and skilled employees. However, this did not 
stay long. As the industry expand with the in surge of capital into the industry from local and 
foreign investors, two categories of flower growers emerged – domestically owned and 
foreign owned farms. In general, the foreign owned firms appeared to have superior 
knowledge and experience than the domestic entrepreneurs most of who have experience in 
other businesses. This brought difference on the productivity of the firms. Melese & Helmsing 
(2010) found significant difference between domestically and foreign owned farms in terms 
of productivity. The foreign owned farms appeared to have visibly higher productivity. More 
importantly, they have also found a different level of cooperation between the two groups of 
flower producers. The foreign owned farms reported to have strong relationships amongst 
themselves that enable the exchange of information and experience about farms including 
core aspect of the business by visiting each other’s farms and discussing better ways of 
managing the farms, the market and local conditions. This is not the case among the Ethiopian 
growers who do not seem to have well established relationship among themselves (Melese & 
Helmsing, 2010; Gebreeyesus & Iizuka, 2010). More interestingly, Melese & Helmsing 
(2010) reported limited cooperation between locally owned and foreign owned farms. 
According to them, the cooperation is incipient and rarely passes the stage of noncore 
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activities like borrowing input from neighbours in case of temporary shortage, exchanging 
none-core information, buying non-strategic inputs jointly, and participating in social 
activities. Interviewed managers have also noted the limited cooperation among flower 
growers. Although they questioned the willingness of their foreign counterparts, they cited the 
local business tradition as a major impeding element.  
The foreign farms tend to perceive that they do not have that much economic incentive 
to cooperate with us. For this reason, they tend to interact with each other more often 
than they do with locally owned farms. What they miss out is that they can get more in 
sight about local conditions from local farm owners and in the process local farms 
would also have the chance to learn from their foreign counterparts’ expertise. Even 
though this has contributed to the lack of cooperation, the local business tradition we 
have is the more impeding one. In Ethiopia, we conceive competition in the most myopic 
way; we perceive our relationship with our competitors as a zero sum game. We think 
we can get market share only when we outperform our local competitor but the reality 
is different. We participate in a global industry where we compete mainly with 
producers from other countries. Globally the competition is more on country level, 
between flower producing countries for reputation and branding, not on firm level. 
(Interview Group, Farm Managers) 
Table 15 - Ethiopian flower producers’ view regarding the industry structure 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total No.of 
respondents 
Mean Standard 
Dev. 
There are  many players in the industry   0 0 11 13 2 26 3.65 0.63 
There is intense competition locally   8 7 11 0 0 26 2.12 1.79 
International competition is stiff    0 0 2 10 14 26 4.46 1.05 
Market access is difficult     0 2 13 8 3 26 3.46 0.83 
There are many entry barriers to competitors 4 8 12 2 0 26 2.46 0.86 
There is collaboration among producers 5 6 11 4 0 26 2.54 0.99 
 
Note – Sampled flower growers were asked how strongly they agree with the aforementioned 
statements regarding the industry’s structure in the Ethiopia based on a five point scale that runs 
from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The numbers in the first 5 columns indicate the 
number of respondents under that scale. The values in the last two columns are average scores 
and standard deviation of the respondents’ rating. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as 
disagreement and > 3.5 as agreement with the respective statement. A score between 2.5 and 3.5 
is indifferent stand. 
The response from questionnaire as shown below in Table 15 indicated the presence of modest 
cooperation in the sector. The absence of strong cooperation among producers especially 
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between local and foreign owners prohibits learning exchange and potential positive spill over 
in the sector. Melese & Helmsing (2010) mentioned a good exceptional instance for positive 
spill over among the growers under the Sher-Ethiopia turnkey project. According to them, 
growers both local and foreigners under the Sher-Ethiopia leased farms cooperate on a range 
of issues such as hiring cool trucks, and visit each others’ farms more frequently than growers 
located elsewhere. Some of the local farm owners reported to have learned from the practice 
of foreign farm owners in their vicinity and thereby improve on their productivity (Melese & 
Helmsing, 2010). Apart from the cooperation aspect, as Taylor (2011; 2010) evidenced, the 
concentration of flower farms in certain areas have become a source of stiff competition not in 
the output market but mainly in the factor market especially with respect to skilled and semi-
skilled labour. Maintaining workforce in areas where flower clusters have grown remarkably 
has become difficult due to a considerable labour mobility between flower farms. 
Gebreeyesus & Izuka (2010) have also acknowledged the emergence of the competition for 
workforce in the latter stages of the industry’s development. The interviewed managers 
acknowledged the presence of the issue and explained that their respective firms use a 
multiple of strategies ranging from contractual obligations to providing incentives to their 
respective workforce. As can be seen in Table 16, sampled flower growers were to rate their 
own firm’s engagement in strategies that promote the mentioned business aspects based on a 
five point scale that runs from hardly to mostly. As the self-rating indicated that the flower 
producers do not have proactive management tradition on issues related to their business. 
Table 16 - Self rating by Ethiopian flower producers regarding their firm engage in strategies that promote the mentioned 
business aspects 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total No.of 
respondents 
Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Marketing Research     3 10 12 1 0 26 2.42 0.76 
Building firm image  2 13 8 3 0 26 2.46 0.81 
Explicit PR strategy     4 15 2 5 0 26 2.31 0.98 
Management of change     1 13 10 2 0 26 2.50 0.71 
Personnel training systems 2 6 11 6 0 25 2.84 0.90 
Choice of market segments 6 12 5 3 0 26 2.19 1.15 
Advertising 4 7 10 5 0 26 2.62 1.01 
People involvement     1 6 17 2 0 26 2.77 0.66 
 
Note – The values in the last two columns are average scores and standard deviation of the 
respondents’ rating. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as an indication of lower engagement 
and > 3.5 as higher engagement in the respective business aspect. A score between 2.5 and 3.5 is 
interpreted as modest engagement.  
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In terms of organization, as described in section 8.1.3, due to the prevailing business 
conditions, most of the flower growers organized themselves in such a way that they have 
direct control over different activities in the supply chain including the core business of 
growing flowers. Most have cooled processing and packing warehouses in their farms to 
prepare the flowers after harvesting. In addition, flower farms have also tended to have their 
own refrigerated trucks to deliver the flowers to the airport. Interviewed managers indicated 
that they sought to have control over these aspects mainly due to the absence of dedicated 
service providers and the resultant higher transaction cost. Even though it seems realistic 
given the current circumstance surrounding the Ethiopian flower supply chain, such 
organization have greater implication on the grower’s focus, cost and risk and hence, affects 
the industry’s productivity. It not only makes flower farms lose their focus on the core 
business of managing their farms but also experience unnecessary costs and risk which could 
have been avoided if there were efficient service providers that can pool the industry’s 
demand for such services. 
In terms of product variety, the Ethiopian flower producers can be categorized into three main 
groups - roses under greenhouse, cuttings under greenhouse, and summer flowers. More than 
80% of the total cultivated area is covered by rose production (GDS, 2011). Even within the 
rose varieties, the product range by most growers is very narrow (GDS, 2011; Joosten, 2007). 
The absence of diversification makes the Ethiopian flower industry highly vulnerable. In 
terms of market strategy and channel, the Ethiopian flower producers are over reliant on the 
Dutch auction system. As explained in section 6.2, nearly 70% of Ethiopian flowers go 
through the Dutch auction. They have limited participation in other market channels such as 
direct marketing. The Dutch auction system provides Ethiopian flower exporters with the 
benefit of transparent pricing system. By aggregating demand and supply forces, the auction 
system sets the conditions for efficient price-setting mechanism with secured transaction 
processing.  In addition, it also offers the opportunity to sell globally and build up image and 
reputation. Although it enable Ethiopian growers sell their products in Europe without 
representation in the Netherlands, the use of agents insulates them from having direct 
interaction with buyers. For this reason, they rely on agents and traders at the auction houses 
for feedback and market information (Melese & Helmsing, 2010). This, however, makes 
Ethiopian growers highly vulnerable as is the case with the product range.  
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The interviewed expert from the Ethiopian Horticulture Producers & Exporters Association 
(EHPEA) noted that direct marketing approach is unrealistic option for many of the Ethiopian 
flower growers who grow on small plots of land and hence, limited produce. According to 
him, in order to participate in direct marketing, farms need to produce in bulk but this is not 
the case for many growers in Ethiopia. He explained that the Ethiopian flower growers are 
missing out opportunities due to such limitations. He recited the experience of American 
flower buyers who visited Ethiopia two years before to examine the possibility of sourcing 
from Ethiopia but unable to do so mainly because Ethiopian growers were not in a position to 
supply in large quantity. As a means to cope up with such challenges, the association has been 
lobbying for creating a legal framework that enable individual exporters to export flower 
products they have collected from various growers. Such scheme, according to the 
association, creates the opportunity to supply larger quantities of flowers to a wider market in 
international markets through direct marketing channels. The interviewed officer from the 
Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA) confirmed that in response to the 
initiative by the association, EHDA is in the process of drafting a new directive aimed at 
addressing this issue.  
With respect to rivalry, the flower industry is truly global. Hence, competition within the 
industry should be seen not in the context of national boundaries. The analysis of competition 
for Ethiopian flower producers should therefore take account of the competing forces in the 
designated global market. Globally, as discussed in Chapter 4, the flower industry is dictated 
by the south-north flows with the largest markets being in the northern hemisphere while 
producers are located closer to the equator. It is mainly with these countries situated near to 
equator, such as Colombia, Ecuador, Kenya, Tanzania and India, that Ethiopian flower 
producers compete in European and other international markets. To the dismay of Ethiopian 
growers, with the shrinking of traditional markets in Europe and North America, competition 
among the producers has intensified (GIA, 2012; Joosten, 2007). Most of these countries have 
more or less similar natural conditions that suit to the cultivation of flowers and hence, the 
competition can be thought to be between fairly equally endowed competitors. However, the 
fact that some of the flower producers are well established ones would mean that they have a 
well-functioning industry that has higher productivity than the recently emerged Ethiopian 
flower industry. For instance, Kenya has higher productivity than Ethiopia although Ethiopia 
has advantage in terms of lower production cost. Not only the productivity difference, there 
are also difference in terms of knowhow, availability of skilled labour, associated 
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infrastructure and other supporting industries (GDS, 2011). Ethiopian growers therefore need 
to improve their productivity and the quality of their produce to catch up competing countries 
and thereby maintain competitive price/quality ratios in global markets.  
8.1.5 Government  
As discussed in section 5, over the past 50 years Ethiopia went through a fundamental 
political transformation from feudal system to socialist and more recently to parliamentary 
government and market oriented rhetoric though the government’s commitment in democracy 
and open market orientation is contested
2
. This has brought shift in government policy and 
practice. The introduction of market oriented approach required a set of reforms and 
complementary policies that creates the basic conditions for the market mechanism. In an 
effort to create these basic conditions, the government has been undertaking a series of World 
Bank and IMF backed reforms under the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP)
3
. Spanning 
over a number of phases, the reform agenda revolves around not only redefining the role of 
public institutions but also laying down the basis for market-based governance and steering 
(Philibert, 2001).   
Parallel with these reforms, the government put in place a wide range of complementary 
development policies and strategies. It adopted Agriculture-Led-Industrialization (ADLI) as a 
long-term development strategy for the country. The strategy is two-pronged, incorporating 
the external sector (export-oriented) on one side and the internal sector, which focuses on the 
forward and backward-linkages between agriculture and industry, on the other side (FDRE, 
2012). Thus, agricultural development is conceived as pivotal to the industrialization process 
as it supplies input to the industry, generate foreign exchange that can be used to import 
industrial inputs, and also promote markets for industrial products. In line with this strategy, 
ever since its rise to power, the incumbent government put outward looking economic policies 
in place of the previous government’s inward looking policies. As part of these endeavors, 
export oriented high value agricultural products are considered as one of the most important 
areas in the country’s development strategy (MFED, 2010; MFED, 2006).  
                                                          
 
2
 The discussion in Chapter 5 indicated that the ideological and practical commitment of the incumbent 
government in Ethiopia differs between policy and discourse. Thus, it is misleading to consider the government 
as committed to the ideals of market algorithm and democracy. It should, however, be noted that there has 
been a economic departure rhetorically and practically from what it used to be during the military regime 
although the political atmosphere seems to be at standstill.  
3
 A detailed discussion on these reforms has been provided in section 5. 
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To this end, the government has taken a series of important actions to create an enabling 
environment for the private sector such as creation of an investment code, establishment of 
federal and regional investment agencies, liberalization of foreign exchange, creation of the 
export promotion agency and introduction of incentive schemes for exporters (EIA, 2013). 
The introduction of the investment proclamation and the subsequent establishment of the 
Ethiopian Investment Agency in 1992 constitute the incumbent government’s early actions. 
Since then, the investment code has been amended several times through a series of 
proclamations in order to accommodate the increasing demands of both foreign and domestic 
investors. The first proclamation, Proclamation No. 15/1992, which was enacted in 1992 
created the basic legal framework for private investment within the country. After four years, 
this proclamation was replaced by Proclamation No. 37/1996, which in turn was replaced by 
another proclamation, Proclamation No. 37/1996. Even though the three proclamations 
addressed the fundamental issues surrounding investment within the country, none of them 
have stipulations aimed at addressing the role of FDI. In an effort to encourage the 
participation of foreign investors, the existing proclamation was fundamentally amended in 
2002 in such a way that it explicitly includes issues related to foreign investors. In line with 
this, on top of the general stipulations pertaining to domestic investors, the 2002 proclamation 
explicitly stipulated the areas open to FDI; the financial limits and requirements; the 
monitoring and reporting requirements; and the available financial incentives (FDRE, 2002). 
This law has been amended three times since then in the year 2003, 2008 and 2012. 
According to the existing proclamations, not all sectors are open for foreign investors. Some 
sectors such as transmission and supply of electricity, large domestic air transport, postal 
service, telecom services and the likes are reserved exclusively for government mainly due to 
national security. Likewise, with the objective of promoting indigenous entrepreneurship and 
the domestic private sector, the financial sector, air transport (less than 20 passengers), import 
trade, small commercial water & road transport and several small businesses are reserved for 
domestic investors. The flower industry is not affected by all these stipulations. With respect 
to the process of getting license, investors are legally obliged to obtain an approval from 
Ethiopian Investment Authority or regional investment authorities for their projects. As far as 
capital is concerned, there is no capital requirement for local investors. This, however, is not 
the case for foreign investors. The general investment rule specifies that foreign investors are 
required to have a minimum initial capital of USD 200 thousand for a wholly foreign-owned 
project. If the project is in partnership with local investors, the minimum capital required is 
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US$ 150 thousand per project. To promote export-oriented FDI, foreign enterprises that 
export at least 75% of their output are exempted from the minimum capital requirement (EIA, 
2013). As the flower industry’s produce are mainly for export market, this would mean that 
investors in the flower industry are not obliged to fulfill the minimum initial capital 
requirement. This reduces the potential entry barrier for small scales investors.  
The Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA), an autonomous government institution, is a 
government institution responsible to promote the country’s investment opportunities and 
conditions to foreign and domestic investors (EIA, 2013). As the agency is responsible to 
manage the procedures, processes and incentives involved with setting up private business in 
the country, its services are crucial in creating enabling environment for investors. In an effort 
to improve its services, the agency has recently launched the so called ‘one-stop shop service’ 
from where investors can get comprehensive services transparently. With this, it claims to 
have drastically streamlined its services (EIA, 2013). Interviewed managers rated the 
agency’s services favorably. The following interview response represents typical view 
forwarded regarding the agency. 
Although cumbersome and time-consuming procedures were major problem during 
the early years of the agency, nowadays the agency is the most vibrant government 
office where customers can get satisfactory services unlike the relatively wide spread 
bottlenecking bureaucracy in other government offices. (Interview group, Farm 
managers) 
Table 17 - Ethiopian flower producers’ view on how supportive the government has been to their business through its policies 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total No.of 
respondents 
Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Govt policy on infrastructure    0 3 11 9 2 25 3.40 0.82 
Govt policy on business start-up    0 2 7 17 0 26 3.58 0.67 
Govt policy on investment incentives    0 0 7 10 9 26 4.08 1.05 
Govt policy on industry regulation   0 4 15 6 1 26 3.15 0.77 
Govt as advertising agent internationally   3 7 9 5 2 26 2.85 1.12 
 Political environment    1 3 8 10 4 26 3.50 1.23 
The Ethiopian Investment Authority 0 2 9 11 4 26 3.65 0.85 
The Ethiopian Horticultural Development 
Agency 
3 3 7 12 1 26 3.19 1.19 
 
Note –The values in the last two columns are average scores and standard deviation of the 
respondents’ rating. Average score of < 2.5 is interpreted as an indication of the government’s 
policy failure and > 3.5 as effectiveness of the government’s policy. A score between 2.5 and 3.5 
is interpreted as modest.  
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A similar response has been found from the response of questionnaire respondents. As can be 
seen from Table 17, sampled flower growers were asked to rate how supportive the 
government has been to their business through its policies based on a five point scale that runs 
from rarely supportive (1) to very supportive (5). As their average response indicates, the 
government is given high rating for most of its policy initiatives.   
As mentioned above, the high value export products are one of the focal areas for the 
government. The horticulture area is considered as the prime one in this regard. In an effort to 
promote the development of the horticulture sector, the government set up the Ethiopian 
Horticultural Development Agency (EHAD). The agency is tasked with the responsibility of 
simplifying the bureaucratic procedures involved with conducting business in the industry and 
thereby, ensuring sustainable growth in the horticulture sector. According to the interviewed 
expert from the agency, the agency gives its service to the industry in three pillars areas: 
investment, capacity building and marketing. Under the investment support service, the 
agency in collaboration with the Ethiopian Investment Agency provides assistance in the 
process of setting up business in the floriculture sector. According to the expert, the agency is 
able to improve the process for investors in the area. As a result, processing time and service 
quality for governmental services in the sector has improved enormously. Even though 
interviewed managers agree with the existence of the improvement in service quality and 
processing time, most of them believed that the agency has a lot to improve especially when 
compared to the vibrant Ethiopian Investment Agency. This has also been reflected in the 
rating the agency got by questionnaire respondents as shown below in Table 17. Despite the 
reservation, the interviewed managers are optimistic regarding the agency’s role in the future. 
According to the interviewed farm managers, the agency is more helpful in the capacity 
building and marketing areas. As discussed in section 8.1.2.3, the agency in collaboration 
with the Horticultural Producers and Exporters Association (EPEA) and the Netherlands 
government initiated a number of capacity development projects in the horticulture sector in 
general, in floriculture in particular.  
In collaboration with the Netherlands government under the Ethio-Netherlands 
Horticulture Partnership Program (ENHPP, we are able to initiate and run a number 
of projects aimed at building capacity in the flower industry for consecutive phases to 
enhance the development and competitiveness of the sector. Under the marketing 
service section, we also help producers in the arrangement of cool chain management 
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and logistics follow-up and promote Ethiopian flowers in the designated foreign 
markets. Initiatives are under way to create a more enabling climate for investors. For 
instance, our ‘Consolidation Directive Proposal’ which aimed at creating the 
framework for large scale supply by Ethiopian flower growers to a wider market in 
Europe and the rest of the world is one of the latest efforts the agency is conducting as 
a means to cope up the challenges of flower producers. Besides, we are also 
strengthening our effort to access new markets in Middle East, Far East and other 
countries in Europe in addition to the traditional European destinations such as the 
Netherlands and Germany, (Interviewee, EHDA expert). 
Although the agency is instrumental in promoting the development of the sector, its 
interventions and endeavors are not yet optimal as far as creating strong cluster is concerned. 
As evidenced in section 8.1.3, the Ethiopian flower industry lacks strong supporting and 
related industry although encouraging development has been evidenced in some aspects. As 
Global Development Solution (2011)study revealed, the sector suffers from the absence of 
vibrant service sector around the primary production. In addition, the interaction between 
local and foreign investors, as uncovered in section 8.1.4, is weak. This hampers technology 
transfer and thereby the development of strong local entities. To this end, more is expected 
from the agency in addressing these specific issues in addition to the efforts it has been 
making so far.   
Even though the agency became more instrumental in the latter years of the sector, it was not 
involved that much in the early stages of the sector’s emergence. As mentioned in Chapter 06, 
the emergence of the Ethiopian flower industry is attributed to the entrepreneurial initiatives 
of local private companies. Despite the early efforts of the association, the government’s role 
was limited until the mid-2000s. Indeed, the government was unaware of the sector’s potential 
and thus, it did not mention the flower industry among the extended list of priority sectors in 
the export promotion strategy it adopted in 1998 (Gebreeyesus & Sonobe, 2011). Once it 
became aware of the sector’s potential, the government has been decisive in promoting the 
sector’s growth by taking proactive efforts ranging from creating conducive investment 
environment to granting incentives to attract local and foreign investors. As part of its 
transformation plan, the government offered a wide range of inducements to investors in the 
flower industry (EIA, 2013). Curtsey to the government’s exemption of flower producers 
from the payment of custom duties and taxes on imports of capital goods and construction 
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materials necessary for the establishment of a new enterprise or for the expansion of an 
existing enterprise, the start-up costs and business risks for investors in the sector has been 
reduced remarkably. Businesses in the industry can apply any depreciation methods for their 
financial statement provided that it is under the universally accepted accounting practices. 
This inducement is further complimented by the exemptions from customs duties or other 
taxes levied on imports of raw materials and packing materials necessary for the production of 
export goods.  
Likewise, flower growers are exempted from the payment of income tax ranging for 7 years. 
In addition, income derived from an expansion or upgrading of their farms is exempted from 
income tax for a period of two years if the expansion increases production value at least by 
25%. In addition, flower producers that suffer losses during the tax holiday period can carry 
forward their initial operating losses. The carry forward scheme is time bounded. Flower 
producers can exercise this right during the 7 tax holiday years. In addition, after the expiry of 
the tax holiday period, their right to do so can be extended for half of the income tax 
exemption period, which is 4 years according to the current stipulation for the flower industry 
(EIA, 2013). Even then when the farms run out of their tax-holiday period, the 30% tax rate 
they face is the same rate as other competing flower producing countries in Africa such as 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (Taylor, 2011). On top of these incentives, the government 
gives guarantee for foreign investors on full repatriation of capital, interest payments on 
foreign loans, profit, dividends, asset sell proceeds and technology transfer payments.  
Foreign investors are also guaranteed against expropriation. As a further confirmation of the 
government’s commitment towards these promises, the country has signed the World Bank's 
convention on the settlement of Investment Disputes and Nationals of other States, which 
provides for the international arbitration of disputes with foreign investors (EIA, 2013).  
In an effort to facilitate the sector’s growth, the government has also leased out land with 
basic utilities for export-led investment at a significantly low price on the long-term basis. 
The price of a lease varies from region to region and depends on several factors, such as the 
location of the land. Majority of the early farms leased out were state owned farms that were 
significantly under-producing and hence, inefficient. In addition to this, it has also made ready 
abundant land at different sites around major cities for local and foreign investors (EIA, 
2013).  According to EHPEA (2014), the government has readied additional 50,000 hectares 
of land to be leased for horticulture development in addition to the already cultivated area. 
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Therefore, investors neither need to prepare capital to purchase the land nor take a risk of 
losing the investment on the land. The process of getting land is simplified thanks to the 
commitment of the government. Constitutionally, land belongs to the state with those entitled 
to land expected to utilise it to the satisfaction of the government. Hence, no individual entity 
or person has the right to own it. To the relief of investors in the flower industry, the 
government circumnavigate some of its own policies on land acquisition in order to facilitate 
the growth of the industry, (Taylor, 2011). Therefore, investors can secure land easily with no 
much bureaucracy once they complete the pre-requisites such as project profile, bank letter, 
investment certificate (for foreigners or joint ventures), Memorandum of Association and 
Articles of Association (if PLC) (Interview Group, EHDA expert). In addition to these 
incentive packages, the government has also been heavily involved in building infrastructure, 
facilitating the accessibility of finance for investors and developing human capital for the 
sector as discussed in sections 8.1.2.2, 8.1.3.1 and 8.1.2.3 respectively.  
With all these attractive investment packages and endeavors, the government created good 
conditions to attract investors to the sector. This has been evidenced by the better position 
Ethiopia has in the World Bank’s Doing Business ranking when compared with other major 
horticultural exporters such as its arch rival Kenya (World Bank, 2015). The interviewed 
managers have also agreed with the notion that the government has played facilitative role in 
the development and growth of the Ethiopian flower industry. The following response from 
one of the interviewed managers summarizes the managers’ response.  
No question that the Ethiopian government’s favorable investment and export 
policies make the business environment friendly to us. This non-hostile business 
environment coupled with the political and macro-economic stability and growth the 
country has been witnessing over the past decade make the country highly sought 
destination for investments. I believe this is one of the reasons that attract local and 
foreign investors, at least in our company case, to establish flower business in the 
country. (Interview group, Farm Managers) 
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Figure 9 - Factors affecting flower growers decision to invest in Ethiopia 
 
Indeed, as has been uncovered in section 7, the flow of FDI to the Ethiopian flower industry 
boomed after the government incentivized the sector. A good case in point is Sher Ethiopia, 
which is one of the most influential players in the Ethiopian flower industry as discussed in 
section 8.1.3.2. The company relocated to Ethiopia from Kenya in 2005 after the Ethiopian 
government started to promote the sector by offering attractive inducements. As can be seen 
from the Figure 9, questionnaire respondents have also rated the government investment 
package as one of the prime reason for entering Ethiopia. The figure presents the outcome 
from the survey conducted among flower farms to provide a subjective assessment on the 
weighting they allocate to a range of factors they consider were important in their investment 
decision to the Ethiopian flower industry. They were asked to identify the most influential 
factors in chorological order in their investment decision and as can be seen, government 
incentive is the prime one. Although the government’s incentive and the investment climate 
are friendly, according to some of the interviewed managers, still there are improvements 
needed in the government bureaucracy.  
Although the government’s commitment and the attractiveness of the incentives are 
undeniable, the lack of autonomy and authority by regulatory staff to use their 
discretionary mandates makes implementation of some regulations and incentives in a 
rather bureaucratic manner. (Interview Group, Farm Managers) 
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Figure 10 - Status of FDI driven projects in the Ethiopian flower industry 
 
Source - Ethiopian Revenue and Custom Authority (ERCA, 2014) 
 Note – Number of investment project refers to the number of flower farms licensed. An individual company 
may have more than one flower farms in the country and hence, the total number of projects does not necessarily 
show the number of firms engaged in the industry.  The above figure shows the number of FDI projects only. It 
does not include projects run by local investors. By the year 2014, a total of 144 FDI projects are registered by 
the Ethiopian Investment Authority.  Pre-implementation refers to the number of projects whose implementation 
was not started in the year project license was given. Implementation and operation refers to the number of 
projects that were started (were on either implementation or operation stage) in the year license was given for the 
projects.  
Astute examination of the implementation of the licensed projects in the flower industry casts 
question regarding the efficiency of governmental services in the latter years. As can be seen 
below Figure 10, all projects that were given license before 2004 either started operation or 
implementation in the same year they are given license. The percentage of projects 
implemented/operationalized in the same year they are given license started to fall between 
2007 and 2009 as the proportion of projects on pre-implementation stage rose. During this 
time, the percentage of implemented/operationalized projects in the same year they are given 
license declined from 99.88 % in 2004 to 85.18 % 2009 respectively. It fell remarkably 
further to a yearly average of 28% between 2011 and 2014. This implies an increase in the 
time lag between the projects’ approval and implementation/operation. As of 2014, 31 of the 
144 projects are on pre-implementation stage while 30 projects are under implementation. 
This means only 58% of the all the FDI driven flower projects have already started operation 
(EIA, 2014).   It is therefore imperative for the government to examine whether this trend is 
due to systematic problem in the investment environment.  
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9 Concluding Remark and Recommendation 
9.1 Production pattern and geographical distribution 
As the analysis in section 5 indicated, in spite of its late entry to the business, Ethiopia has 
established itself as one of the important flower supplier to the global flower industry in 
general, Europe in particular.  The export value mushroomed from less than a million USD a 
decade ago to nearly 170 USD million. Indirect reports claim that it is nearly 230 million 
USD. Whichever way, the statistics shows that the country has transformed itself into a well 
established supplier within a short period of time. With such performance, the sector is not 
only contributing to the diversification of the country’s income base but also creating 
significant employment opportunities directly and indirectly. This has a direct bearing on the 
development endeavour of the country. With the government’s plan of capacitating the sector 
and the entry of new investors, the sector is expected to grow further and thereby play even 
more role in the economy. However, the analysis indicated that the whole picture is not 
flushed. The sector’s performance over the last few years was not as expected. In the last few 
years, export value not only lagged behind governmental target but also decreased from the 
previous years’ values. With this, it is questionable if the sector is going to achieve the 1 
billion USD yearly export value set by the government at the end of the decade.    
Apart from this, the value chain analysis has uncovered how dependent the Ethiopian flower 
industry is on the European market. It shows the pivotal role played by the European flower 
industry not only as destination market but also as an important source of inputs necessary for 
growing flowers in Ethiopia. Nearly 70% of the exports go through the Dutch auction system. 
This is attributed to the active role played by the Dutch growers that are taking part in the 
Ethiopian flower industry directly or indirectly. Unless the growers diversify their market 
base to newly emerging and other matured markets, they will be exposed to greater risk that 
comes from the absence of market diversification. Even though there are efforts being made 
by the Ethiopian Horticultural Producers and Exporters Association (EHPEA), the Ethiopian 
Horticultural Agency (EHA) and other governmental offices, the effort has not yet been able 
to bring the desired change.  
Another interesting issue that came to light in the analysis is the inconsistency regarding the 
export value. The export value reported by the Ethiopian authorities is found to be 
significantly lower than the value reported by the importing countries. The extended analysis 
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done to examine the reason indicated that the discrepancy is too big to be attributed to the 
difference in quantity measurement, time lag, misallocation etc. Neither can it be accounted 
due to the under-reporting by Ethiopian exporters as they do not have economic incentive to 
do so. Instead, the analysis indicated that there is economic incentive by importers of the 
Ethiopian flower products in the destination countries such as within the EU to engage in an 
elusive trade practices to take advantage of the privilege Ethiopian flowers are given by the 
respective governments. It is, therefore, important to make further inquiry into the case.  
9.2 FDI inflow, structure, origin and implication to the sector 
The Ethiopian flower industry has attracted FDI from different countries. FDI has been 
instrumental in the emergence of the Ethiopian flower industry into the global scene. As the 
study revealed, the total number of FDI projects in the Ethiopian flower industry grew 
remarkably from 1 in 1997 to 144 in 2014. Although the annual increase in the number of 
new FDI projects was acute in the early 2000’s, it showed a general declining trend in recent 
years. Similar trend has been found regarding the size of the FDI inflow.  The annual inflow 
increased remarkably in the early days of the sector and slowed in the latter years. Although 
the annual FDI inflow slowed down in recent years, the FDI stock in the country’s flower 
industry grew from non-existent in the late 1990’s to more than 900 million USD in 2014. In 
line with the declining trend, the relative share of the flower industry’s FDI in the general 
economy showed declining trend in the last four years. It is therefore important for the 
government of Ethiopia and other interested stakeholders and researchers to look into why the 
FDI inflow decreased over the years. Besides, the government needs to make renewed effort 
to attract FDI to the sector so that the sector can grow more.  
In terms of origin, the FDI in the Ethiopian Flower industry originates from around 34 
countries.  At individual country level, India is found to be the principal source followed by 
the Netherlands, China and Malaysia in respective order. These four countries are the source 
of more than 60% of the total FDI flow. At regional level, Asia and Europe are found to be 
the most important ones. In addition to geographical proximity, existing economic interaction, 
the investment friendly environment, cheap cost of production and suitable natural conditions, 
bilateral and multilateral programmes have also played significant role in attracting the FDI 
flow to the Ethiopian flower industry.  
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Another interesting thing in the Ethiopian flower industry is that the FDI dominates the sector 
by accounting for around 80% of the total investment in the industry as a whole. In terms of 
firm number, out of the 120 firms in the industry 73 are FDI driven while 11 are joint 
ventures. Only the remaining 36 are fully local companies. This shows how significant FDI is 
in the flower industry unlike majority of the other export oriented industries such as coffee 
wherein local investors play the major role. As pointed out elsewhere in this study, in addition 
to serving as source of finance and boosting national GDP, theoretically FDI is thought to 
provide productivity spill over to local firms.  These productivity spill over, whether it is 
technical, managerial process transfer or efficient operations, are mainly transferred by way of 
imitation, skill acquisition, competition and exports (Görg & Greenaway, 2004).  For these 
mechanisms to work, there has to be strong competitive or collaborative link between the 
local and foreign firms. As the analysis in this study revealed, the experience in the Ethiopian 
flower industry is patchy. Indeed, the foreign owned firms are found to have superior 
knowledge and experience than the locally owned firms in terms of productivity. This goes in 
line with what the theory posits. However, different level of interaction between the two 
groups of flower producers has been found. The foreign owned farms are reported to have 
strong relationships amongst themselves. This is not the case among the Ethiopian growers 
who do not seem to have well established relationship with each other. More interestingly, the 
cooperation between locally owned and foreign owned farms is found to be weak. This is not 
surprising. Economically speaking, the foreign firms have the incentive not to share their 
technical knowledge process to their local competitors. From the industry’s development 
point of view, however, this creates an unfavourable condition for the development of local 
firms as the sector become more fenced by the FDI firms, preventing local investors from 
learning the business. Therefore, it is  important to assess the implication of FDI dominance in 
the industry more in detail, how can the challenges coming with the dominance of FDI can be 
coped up with and whether the experience can be transferred to other export oriented 
industries. 
9.3 Competitiveness of the Industry 
As the discussion in Chapter 4  indicated, flower producers and industry actors have become 
global business players chasing relative advantages in terms of inducements and costs to open 
up new and expand existing projects. As the conclusion drawn in section 9.1 and 9.2 
indicated, the Ethiopian flower industry attracted significant amount of FDI and export 
88 
 
production levels in the past decade. The comprehensive analysis in section 8.1.5 revealed 
that the friendly investment climate in combination with the favourable factor conditions such 
as climatic conditions, natural resources, and the availability of cheap labour are the major 
catalysts in attracting foreign investors. The other determinants of competitiveness i.e. related 
and supporting industries, demand condition and firm structure and rivalry are found to be 
weak.  
As the analysis made in section 8.1.5 indicated, the Ethiopian government has been 
instrumental in facilitating the development of the flower industry although the sector 
emerged as a result of private entrepreneurship. Through its favorable investment law, 
attractive tax exemption privileges for both local and foreign investors, provision of cheap 
financing, continued support and priority to infrastructure development for floriculture 
investment areas, the government created good conditions to attract local and foreign 
investors. However, as Porter (1990) pointed out the government’s role cannot guarantee the 
continued competitiveness of the Ethiopian flower industry.  
With respect to the factor conditions, as the analysis in section 8.1.2 revealed, Ethiopia has 
relatively good factor conditions compared to other flower producing countries in Africa. It 
has advantage with respect to quality produce due to suitable natural conditions, cost of 
freight, cost of production and proximity to the major European market. Although there is 
shortage of skilled manpower, the country has cheap and plentiful labour supply than many 
flower growing African countries. However, the country’s flower industry is entangled by 
lack of skills, professional education and experience. This can be a challenge for the 
competitive positioning of the industry globally. The country also has a much better civil life 
than its competing counterparts. These factors combined with the suitable natural conditions 
and improving infrastructures makes the country amongst one of the preferred countries for 
flower production as far as factor conditions are concerned. 
The local demand situation, as pointed out in section 8.1.1, is insignificant at its current level 
given the fact that majority of the Ethiopian population is living at subsistent level with 
undeveloped flower consumption culture. Therefore, the local demand is not in a position to 
play the role postulated by Porter’s (1990) diamond framework. It may not do so in the 
foreseeable future either. However, given the progress it has showed over the years, it has a 
potential to enhance producers’ competitiveness in a peripheral but important way especially 
when the local growers encounter demand shocks in their export markets. With the rising 
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culture of buying flowers and the improving economic condition, the local demand in 
Ethiopia can become an important alternative market in case of demand shock in the 
designated foreign markets. Even though it does not benefit from the local demand situation 
in terms of competitiveness in the conventional way, as the analysis suggested, having strong 
interaction with the European flower industry is pivotal in enabling the Ethiopian flower 
industry keep in touch with the global trend. However, the Ethiopian flower industry should 
devise a way to reduce its dependency on the European market by making effort to diversify 
its destination to other regional markets such as Far East, Middle East and North American 
markets. 
With respect to the role of related and supporting industry, the analysis in section 8.1.3 
showed that it is at its infancy stage. Although the financial sector has a non-competitive 
market structure with undeveloped regulatory environment, the Ethiopian flower industry has 
benefitted from the availability of highly favourable government-funded loans through the 
state-owned Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBoE). In spite of the generous offers, the 
bottlenecking bureaucracy along with the inexperience of the bank with flower business has 
affected the service quality. As far as industry suppliers are concerned, the input supply 
linkage in the Ethiopian flower industry in its current situation is not in a position to promote 
the competitiveness of the sector when compared to other competing flower producing 
countries such as Kenya. Likewise, the transportation and logistics service provision is also 
not efficiently developed to help the continued development of the sector although significant 
improvements have been achieved over the past few years. When the capacity improvement 
projects at the Bole International Airport and the Ethiopian Airlines are completed, the 
transportation and logistics sector is expected to be capable enough to encourage the 
emergence of dedicated independent service providers and thereby put the Ethiopian flower 
industry at least in par with its Kenyan counterpart. However, in its present organization it 
constitutes one of the prime challenges for Ethiopian flower exporters. The Ethiopian 
Horticulture Producers and Exporters Association (EHPRA) is found to be an important 
industry actor lobbying and facilitating the development of the sector.  
The industry structure is also found to be not sufficiently organized to help the further 
development of the sector. Most of the flower farms are located within a radius of 50 
kilometres from Addis Ababa.  This created the agglomeration of cut flower industry service 
providers in Addis Ababa. Such agglomeration is found to be challenging for the sector’s 
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expansion to broader parts of the country. Due to this, and the absence of specialized and 
dedicated service providers, most of the flower growers organized themselves in such a way 
that they have direct control over different activities in the supply chain including the core 
business of growing flowers. Such organization has greater implication on productivity within 
the industry as it makes flower farms not only lose their focus on the core business of 
managing their farms but also experience unnecessary costs and risk which could have been 
avoided if there were efficient service providers that can pool the industry’s demand for such 
services. In terms of product variety and market channel, the Ethiopian flower producers not 
only have narrow product range but also extremely reliant on the Dutch Auction system. Even 
though the auction system provides them with a range of benefits including transparent and 
efficient price-setting mechanism, secured transaction processing, and the possibility to sell 
globally and build up image and reputation, it makes Ethiopian growers highly vulnerable as 
is the case with the product range.  
All in all, the Ethiopian flower industry has a number of short comings although it established 
itself as a global player in a very short period of time. Out of the four competitiveness 
determinants, only the factor condition is found to be strong enough to support the growth of 
the industry. Even in the factor conditions, only the basic factors are the ones that are acting 
as catalyst. The advanced factors such as skilled labor are far behind when compared to other 
competing countries. The other instrumental factor in the development of the sector is, as 
pointed out above, is the government through its investment packages. Even though 
governmental incentives are imperative to encourage growth, in the long run it cannot create 
sustainable competitive advantage. Rather, firms that enter a country merely owing to 
governmental incentives are bound to leave the respective country when they are offered 
better incentives elsewhere or when the incentives are no longer available. Given this, it can 
be said that the Ethiopian flower industry is at Porter’s (1990) factor-driven stage as the 
industry bases on the low-cost that comes from cheap labor and low cost natural resources.  
It is therefore imperative for the government to devise holistic strategy that goes in line with 
the industry’s stage of development. In order to enable the industry to move to the next stage, 
strategies aimed at enhancing scale economies and stimulating the development of a vibrant 
and supportive horticulture cluster should be devised. Effort should also be made not only to 
provide sufficient capital to invest in new technology but also wide initiative is needed to 
improve sector knowledge to increase crop yields and quality. Likewise, the range of 
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activities embedded in the supply chain also needs to be organized in such a way that they 
support the competitiveness of the industry globally. This is especially a case with the 
international transport and marketing, which, as pointed out in section 6.2, constitutes the 
largest part of the overall farm to market cost. Such orientation creates enabling environment 
that capacitate flower growers to cultivate new and existing land more efficiently, scale up 
production and adopt new technology. Once a well functioning and supporting cluster is 
developed, existing producers can expand their business more easily and more new producers 
will be attracted to invest into the industry. In addition, the effort to upgrade the country’s 
infrastructure should be strengthened and accelerated so that the sector can catch up with the 
other flower exporting countries. Besides, a renewed effort to expand the market destination 
and human resource development has to be made as the ongoing efforts have yet to yield that 
much result. All these require a coordinated effort by both private and public actors. And 
hence, both the government, industry actors such as the Ethiopian Horticultural Producers and 
Exporters Association (EHPEA), individual firms should come together and work more 
closely to create enabling environment for the sector.   
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Appendix 
1. Flower Farm Interview  
Name of respondent.........................................................................................................  
Name of firm....................................................................................................................  
Year of Incorporation........................................................................................................  
Firms Strategy, Structure and Rivalry  
1. Would you please start by telling me about the history of your firm and how and why it 
entered the Ethiopian floriculture industry?   
2. What was the origin of the capital used to establish the firm?  What is the equity composition 
of the firm?  Can you give me an idea of the cost breakdown involved with the establishment 
and running of the farm?   
3. What kinds of flower does the company grow mainly and how has this changed over time? 
Where is the main market? 
4. Can you give me an indication of the company’s production capacity, actual production and 
sale and profitability and how this has changed over the firm’s time in the industry?   
5. How do you describe the competition you encounter from other flower growers in Ethiopia? 
How would you assess your relationship with other growers in terms of competition, 
cooperation, knowledge sharing etc.? Does this differ between Ethiopian and foreign 
growers? How about the competition globally?  
6. Have you examined the possibility of performing other functions within floriculture i.e. 
packaging production, bouquet production, propagation etc? What steps have you taken 
towards these developments? 
Demand condition 
1. How do you sell your product?  How was the price of flowers when you started business and 
how did this change over the years?  How the demand for flowers (local and foreign) when 
you started your business and how is the situation in recent years? 
2. How do you rate the domestic demand currently and how do you see its potential in the 
future? 
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3. How do you sell your product, directly to exporters or through intermediary? How do your 
relationship with the exporters/intermediaries? 
Factor condition 
1. Can you tell me about your staffing levels in terms of how many permanent and temporary 
staff you employ and how these requirements change over time?   
2. Have you employed any skilled labor from Ethiopia? How do you describe the skill level 
available in the country and what training do you conduct with employees on your farm?   
3. Since you started producing cut-flowers, have you improved wage and non-wage working 
conditions (e.g. housing, schooling, and recreational facilities) for workers on your farm? Is 
there a legally stipulated minimum wages for farm employees? If so, how do you pay your 
employees relative to that stipulation? 
4. How do you rate the financial services and availability of capital (be it through equity or loan) 
for the sector in Ethiopia? 
5. How do you rate the suitability/availability of physical resources such as land, agro-ecology, 
and proximity to target market in Ethiopia relative to other African countries?    
6. How do you rate the available infrastructures such as supply of electricity, communication 
services, water supply and research and extension capability in Ethiopia relative to other 
African countries? 
Related and Supporting industries 
1. Where do you obtain your supplies from?  Which of your supply functions are located in 
Ethiopia and which are negotiated elsewhere?   
2. How do you handle the problems with your suppliers if there are issues?  
3. How would you assess the handling agents available to growers in Ethiopian floriculture and 
your relationships with them?   
4. How would you assess your relationships with breeders and other suppliers and service 
providers in the sector in Ethiopia?  
5. How would you assess the role of Ethiopian financial institutions in the industry?’ 
6. How do you assess the role of Ethiopian Horticultural Producers Association? 
7. How do you assess the cold storage and transportation services available to the sector within 
Ethiopia? 
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Government role  
1. How do you feel about your company’s relationships with government institutions and actors?  
How has this changed since the creation of the Horticulture Development Agency? How do 
you assess the role of the agency and how is your relation with the agency? 
2. Are you familiar with the government’s investment policy and engagement in the sector? 
How do you assess the government’s engagement and endeavor in the sector relative to other 
flower producing countries in Africa? 
Cross-cutting Issues 
1. What are the factors that could foster successful floriculture business in Ethiopia? 
2. Do you have any observations on any present or future problems/obstacles faced by flower 
producers in Ethiopia? What are your views on the future of the Ethiopian flower industry? 
3. Do you regularly assess alternative production locations outside of Ethiopia?  What would be 
the key factors in causing you to move your investment out of Ethiopia? What measures do 
you take to remain internationally competitive?  
4. What measures and improvements should the government take in order to make the sector 
more competitive globally? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
2. QUESTIONNAIRE TO FARM MANAGERS/OWNERS 
Dear Sir/Madam 
I am Behailu Aschalew, MSc student at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). 
Currently, I am working on my thesis titled ‘FDI flow and competitiveness in the Ethiopian 
Flower Industry’. This questionnaire is set up to gather data regarding the perception of 
flower producers in the Ethiopian flower industry. Full confidentiality for all response is 
guaranteed. Notes from the questionnaire will be kept confidential and be destroyed after the 
study is completed. No personal identifiers will be included in reporting the results. You are 
kindly requested to give your response. Please the reliability and validity of the study is 
entirely dependent on the quality of your response. At this juncture, the researcher would like 
to extend his gratitude in advance for your sincere cooperation. 
Notice:    
 No need of writing name 
 Most questions request responses on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. 1 indicates one extreme end 
of the choices (for example very low or I totally disagree) while 5 indicates the other extreme 
of the choices (for example very high or I totally agree). 
  Be sure to CIRCLE or TICK your answer on the scale or short answer on the space provided 
 
PART ONE: GENERAL INFORMATION 
Please enter your details below:  
Name of respondent (Optional) ___________________________________________ 
Name of firm _________________________________________________________  
Year of Incorporation ___________________________________________________  
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE FIRM 
1. For how long has your company been in operation in this industry in Ethiopia?   
 
Less than 1 year    
1-3 years     
4-5 years     
Over 5 years     
 
2. What is the ownership structure of your company? 
Local     
Foreign     
Both local and foreign  
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PART B: DETERMINANTS OF SUSTAINED NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 
DEMAND CONDITIONS (The scale runs from very insignificant (1) to very significant (5)) 
 1  2 3 4 5  
How do you rate the proportion of your 
local sales to your total sales?       
     
How would you describe the local 
demand progress?       
     
How would you rate the bargaining 
power of your local demand?        
     
How would you describe the level of 
sophistication/complexity of your local 
demand 
     
 
FACTOR CONDITIONS    
 
1. How do you rate the supply of the following natural resources? (the scale runs from 
very scarce to readily available) 
 1  2 3 4 5  
Land          
Water             
2. How do you rate the quality of the following natural resources? (the scale runs from 
bad to excellent) 
 1  2 3 4 5  
Land          
Water             
Climate      
3. How do you rate the relative cost of the following natural resources (the scale runs 
from expensive to cheap) 
 1  2 3 4 5  
Land          
Water             
4. Please indicate the characteristics of your labor force. (The scale runs from very low to 
very high) 
     1  2 3 4 5  
Wages and salaries          
Education      
Skills/Training           
Availability      
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RELATED AND SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES   
 
1. What would you say about capital in your industry? (The scale runs from very low to 
very high) 
 1  2 3 4 5  
Requirement to start business        
Availability      
Cost of capital          
Bargaining power of financiers        
2. To what extent has collaboration with local supporting organizations contributed to 
your success?  (The scale runs from low contribution to high contribution) 
 1  2 3 4 5  
Ethiopian electric power corporation      
Ethio-Telecom          
The Ethiopian Horticultural Producers and Exporters 
Association      
     
Insurance companies          
Financial institutions          
Learning and R&D institutions such as universities        
Land Transportation service providers      
Air Transport service providers      
Logistics service providers           
Seeds/Seedlings suppliers      
Packaging materials suppliers      
Fertilizer and chemical suppliers      
 
FIRMS STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND RIVALRY  
 
1. What would you say about the following market structure attributes?     (The scale 
runs from I Disagree to I agree) 
 1  2 3 4 5  
There are  many players in the industry        
There is intense competition locally        
International competition is stiff         
Market access is difficult          
There are many entry barriers to competitors      
There is collaboration among producers      
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2. To what extent does your firm engage in strategies that promote the following 
business aspects?  (The scale runs from hardly to mostly) 
 1  2 3 4 5  
Marketing innovation          
Building firm image       
Explicit PR strategy          
Management of change          
Marketing Research          
Personnel training systems      
Choice of market segments      
Advertising      
People involvement          
 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES    
1. How supportive has the government been to your business through its policies on the 
following?    (The scale runs from very supportive to very unsupportive) 
 1  2 3 4 5  
Govt policy on human resources         
Govt policy on Science & Technology        
Govt policy on infrastructure         
Govt policy on demand stimulation               
Govt policy on business start-up         
Govt policy on protectionism         
Govt policy on taxes          
Govt policy on industry regulation        
Govt as advertising agent internationally        
 Political environment         
2. To what extent can the success of your firm be traced to the following factors (The 
scale runs from very low to very high). 
     1  2 3 4 5  
Abundance of cheap labor      
Land      
Good climate      
Friendly culture         
Other (please specify)      
 
Do you have any observations on any present or future challenges faced by flower producers 
in Ethiopia? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
______________ 
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What are your views on the future of the Ethiopian flower industry? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
______________ 
What measures and improvements should the government take in order to make the sector 
more competitive globally? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
